Maximizing Intellectual Property: Optimality, Synchronicity, and Distributive Justice by David Blankfein-Tabachnick
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 94 
Number 1 Volume 94, Winter 2020, Number 1 Article 2 
Maximizing Intellectual Property: Optimality, Synchronicity, and 
Distributive Justice 
David Blankfein-Tabachnick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 




MAXIMIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 




This Article addresses the distributive structure of intellec-
tual property and innovation policy1 and the foundational role it 
plays in distributive justice.  Distributive accounts of law are 
undergoing a renaissance; an unprecedented paradigm shift away 
from the wealth-maximizing approach to law and legal theory 
and toward a distributive view.2  In line with this shift, this 
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1 Intellectual property traditionally pertains to patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
and trade secrets, while innovation policy marks a broader set of legal incentives to 
innovation. 
2 See Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 
1491–92 (2018); David Blankfein-Tabachnick & Kevin A. Kordana, Kaplow and 
Shavell and the Priority of Income Taxation and Transfer, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 9 
(2017) [hereinafter Blankfein-Tabachnick & Kordana, Kaplow and Shavell]; Zachary 
Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should 
Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2482 (2014); Matthew 
Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About Economic Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 40 (2016); Mark A. Geistfeld, Cost-Benefit Analysis Outside of 
Welfarism, 37 REVUS 1, 4-5 (2019); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, 
Taxation, the Private Law, and Distributive Justice, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 142, 163 
(2006); Samuel Scheffler, Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of 
Private Law, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 229 (2015); SAMUEL FREEMAN, 
LIBERALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 167–94 (2018); Todd D. Rakoff, The Five 
Justices of Contract Law, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 733, 737; Kevin A. Kordana & David H. 
Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 599 (2005); Kevin 
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Article breaks new ground in providing a needed framework for a 
distributive theory of intellectual property law and innovation 
policy and articulates an appealing, egalitarian alternative to 
wealth- or welfare-maximizing accounts of intellectual property 
and innovation policy.  In doing so, this Article diagnoses and 
serves as a corrective to a seemingly systematic omission in the 
mature scholarly literature surrounding intellectual property.  
This omission is namely the underappreciated role that optimal 
tax rates and optimal legal rule construction play in the context 
of a distributive account of intellectual property and innovation 
policy.  This Article concludes that for maximizing accounts of 
intellectual property—whether aimed at net-aggregate wealth or 
welfare,3 or in egalitarian fashion, aimed at the economic position 
of the least well-off4—rules governing intellectual property are on 
a conceptual par with legal rules traditionally conceived of as 
 
A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Correc-
tive Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1281–82 (2006) [hereinafter Kordana & 
Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat]; Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Blankfein 
Tabachnick, The Rawlsian View of Private Ordering, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 288, 288 
(2008). 
3 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 38–46 (7th ed. 2007) 
(discussing the justification of copyright and patent as predicated on net-aggregate 
wealth creation; noting that “the dynamic [economic] rationale for property rights is 
readily applied to the useful ideas that we call inventions”); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 
325–53 (1989) (articulating a wealth-maximizing justification for intellectual proper-
ty and noting that “[f]or copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its principal 
legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits from creating 
additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the costs of admin-
istering copyright protection”); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 2 (2011) (“Current convention has it that IP law seeks to maximize the 
net social benefit of the practices it regulates. The traditional utilitarian formula-
tion—the greatest good for the greatest number—is expressed here in terms of 
rewards.”); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy 
Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544, 558–93 (2019) (discussing optimal innovation policy 
from a chiefly welfare-maximizing perspective). 
4 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72, 266 (rev. ed. 1999) (describing eco-
nomic inequalities as justified if they are “to the greatest . . . benefit of the least 
advantaged” in terms of an objective index of what Rawls calls primary goods); 
MERGES, supra note 3, at 136 (describing monopolistic protection as justified in a 
Rawlsian scheme where “the poor benefit so much from things covered by IP rights 
that the products covered by those rights more than make up for the excess 
distributional shares that wind up in the hands of rightowners”); David H. 
Blankfein-Tabachnick, Intellectual Property Doctrine and Midlevel Principles, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 1315, 1342–43 (2013) (describing monopolistic protection in intel-
lectual property as justified in Rawlsianism only if it finds a home in the complete 
scheme of legal and economic institutions that serve to maximize the position of the 
least well-off, subject to lexically prior liberty and opportunity constraints). 
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merely operating in the “background” of intellectual property.  
Intellectual property has traditionally been understood as the 
legal doctrine surrounding copyrights, patents, and trade secrets.5  
But legal institutions well beyond these areas of law are crucial 
to setting optimal incentives surrounding innovation and the gov-
ernance and control of knowledge goods; this broader range of 
legal institutions can be described as innovation policy.  This 
Article shows that maximizing principles demand a certain 
synchronicity among entitlement-governing legal rules, and those 
distinct maximizing principles demand unique sets of optimal 
legal rules—inclusive of intellectual property and innovation 
policy—and, further, that each respective set of legal rules must 
be constructed in light of a unique optimal tax rate.  These obser-
vations have important ramifications for ongoing disputes in 
intellectual property scholarship—for example, the debate over 
monopolistic legal rules versus taxation and prizes6—as well as  
 
5 For discussion and defense of the traditionalist approach to intellectual 
property law as a limited domain, see MERGES, supra note 3, at 132 (describing 
intellectual property law beyond these three areas as the “periphery” and specifically 
noting that “[t]axation is of course external to IP law”); 1 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2019, at 31 (2019) 
(discussing copyrights, patents, and trade secrets and noting that “[i]ntellectual 
property law has traditionally been taught along doctrinal lines”); Hemel & 
Ouellette, supra note 3, at 551 (discussing the traditional view critically and ex-
panding the discussion to “innovation policy,” noting that “[a]lthough intellectual 
property law historically has been the principal field in which legal scholars have 
thought about innovation policy, governments [incentivize] innovation and allocate 
access to knowledge goods through a wide variety of mechanisms”); Daniel J. Hemel 
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents—Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 
304–05 (2013) (conceiving of innovation policy as beyond the traditional account; 
“[l]awyers and economists have long recognized that the patent system is not the 
only possible mechanism for incentivizing the production of new knowledge: 
government-awarded prizes and grants can perform similar functions”); Amy 
Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How To Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 978 (2012) (rejecting internalism and advocating 
for an externalist and distributive approach, although not one focused on max-
imizing the position of the least well-off); Peter S. Menell, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Social Justice: Mapping the Next Frontier, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. 
RTS. CONF. J. 147, 161–63, 186–90 (2016) (discussing the internal and external 
perspective and their relationship to distributive and social justice). 
6 See generally Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Better Pharmaceutical 
Innovations at Much Lower Prices, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: 
PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 135 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 
2010) [hereinafter INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH] (discussing a system of 
taxation and prizes, from an essentially Rawlsian perspective); Steven Shavell & 
Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 
525 (2001) (comparing a system of taxation and prizes with monopolistic protection 
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ramifications for doctrinal intellectual property disputes concerning 
the copyright/patent divide7 and bankruptcy’s treatment of intel-
lectual property.8 
This Article first addresses intellectual property from the 
perspective of its internal doctrinal boundaries, that is, the 
copyright/patent distinction, and then from outside its traditional 
parameters, in its relationship to non-intellectual property legal 
rules.  This Article shows that external normative principles9 are 
 
as incentives to innovation); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3; Hemel & Ouellette, 
supra note 5. 
7 See Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright 
and Patent Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1494–95 (2017) (discussing 
doctrinal boundaries between copyright and patent). See also Peter S. Menell & 
Daniel Yablon, Star Athletica’s Fissure in the Intellectual Property Functionality 
Landscape, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 147 (discussing the boundary between 
copyright and patent skeptically in the context of Star Athletica, and noting the 
possibility of creating “mutant species” of intellectual property law); Viva R. Moffat, 
Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual 
Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1521 (2004) (discussing the 
possibility of a “mutant” form of copyright); Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. 
Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 1293, 1293–94 (2017) (discussing 
intellectual property’s internal partitions, focusing on the legal mechanisms de-
signed to screen for functionality in the domain of utility patents, and distinguishing 
among filtering, exclusion, and threshold style-screens); Kevin Emerson Collins, 
Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1603, 1607 (2017) (innovatively 
and insightfully discussing the ways in which patent law does and should guard 
against the invasion of authorial work); Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon 
Sprigman, What’s In and What’s Out: How IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 491, 492 (2017) (discussing the boundary surrounding utility 
patents). 
8 See generally Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property 
Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733 (2007) (comprehensively 
discussing the treatment of intellectual property in the context of bankruptcy with 
particular attention to potential tensions and conflicts in law); Jennifer Ying, 
Comment, The Plain Meaning of Section 365(c): The Tension Between Bankruptcy 
and Patent Law in Patent Licensing, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1225 (2010) (discussing the 
potential tension between patent licenses and bankruptcy’s goals); Alan Schwartz, A 
Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998) 
(defending a contractualist approach to bankruptcy from a wealth maximizing 
perspective, including—contra the bankruptcy code—the upholding of ipso facto 
clauses in bankruptcy, for example, pre-bankruptcy contractual terms predicated on 
insolvency). 
9 See Henry Smith, The View from Germany, NEW PRIV. L. (Sept. 7, 2015, 8:43 AM), 
https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/09/07/the-new-private-law-the-view-from-germany- 
henry-smith/ [https://perma.cc/8XQL-7Y2X] (drawing a distinction between values 
internal to legal doctrine and those external to it, and posing the instructive 
question, “[s]hould a theory or explanation or justification of the law respond more to 
considerations of internal coherence? Or should a theory of law be judged on how 
well it makes legal results correspond with some external purpose, be it efficiency, 
fairness, conformance to wider cultural patterns or something else?”); Kapczynski, 
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capable of playing a crucial role in resolving seemingly intractable 
internal doctrinal conflicts.  But, where such external principles 
are maximizing, traditional or conventional boundaries internal 
to intellectual property are untenable.  This Article maintains that, 
in the context of maximizing principles, intellectual property 
rules cannot be conceptually or methodologically disambiguated 
from other entitlement-oriented legal rules, for example, those of 
bankruptcy and taxation.  The distinction between intellectual 
property rules and “background” rules is illusory.  This Article 
shows that egalitarian distributive principles aimed at maximiz-
ing the position of the least well-off operate along an important 
dimension, in an analogous fashion to wealth- and welfare-
maximizing theories.  However, when properly understood, such 
theories construct a unique set of optimal entitlement-oriented 
rules—inclusive of intellectual property and innovation policy—
conjoined with uniquely optimal taxation rates.  This Article shows 
that this relationship between intellectual property and optimal 
taxation rates has gone underappreciated, even in the context of 
a mature and sophisticated scholarly literature.  This Article 
aims to serve as a corrective to the current omission. 
Part I of this Article discusses competing normative con-
ceptions of private law, focusing on intellectual property and 
innovation policy in light of the current debate over empirical 
versus normative accounts of intellectual property and the schol-
arly renaissance in distributive accounts of private law.  Despite 
the fever pitch of the current scholarly debate, this Part shows 
that there are important methodological similarities between 
wealth-maximizing and maximizing distributive principles, and 
that such distributive principles are capable of supporting an 
underappreciated account of intellectual property and innovation 
policy.  Part II discusses the domain of copyright and patent 
protection.  The discussion first addresses the internal workings 
of intellectual property doctrine, specifically, the patent/copyright 
divide in the context of the conflict surrounding the Useful 
Article Doctrine, and then discusses skeptical concerns over 
copyright’s monopolistic protection.  Part III then poses a puzzle 
for forward-looking maximizing theories: the question of whether 
or not such theories are even capable of justifying monopolistic 
protection, or if instead, they point in the direction of alternative 
 
supra note 5, at 975 (distinguishing between internal and external accounts of intel-
lectual property and casting reasonable skepticism on internalist accounts while 
defending the externalist approach). 
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forms of institutional design, for example, a system of taxation 
and prizes.  Part IV discusses the traditional distinction between 
intellectual property and innovation policy and “background” 
rules—specifically budget expenditures and bankruptcy policy.  
Drawing upon an instructive doctrinal conflict in bankruptcy’s 
positive law, Part IV concludes that, in the context of maximizing 
principles, any distinction between intellectual property and 
background rules is illusory.  In light of the previous sections, 
Part V culminates in the diagnosis and remedy of an important 
omission in the sophisticated scholarship surrounding intellectual 
property and innovation policy.  Part V addresses the underap-
preciated fact that maximizing principles require synchronicity 
among all property entitlement governing legal rules, inclusive of 
intellectual property and innovation policy.  Crucially, such prin-
ciples demand the construction of an optimal set of legal rules, 
conjoined with an optimal tax rate; this Part holds that any 
departures from optimal rule construction cannot be offset by 
alterations in taxation, if one is to meet the demands of maximiz-
ing distributive principles.  The final Part provides a conclusion. 
I.  THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND EXTERNAL PRINCIPLES 
A. Conceptions of Private Law 
Consider first competing conceptions of the private law 
generally.  Scholars of private law concern themselves with the 
private law’s normative structure.  There is, for example, a long-
standing debate over how to best understand an ideal contract 
law.  One theory is that an ideal contract law should instantiate 
the value of autonomy through the backward-looking value of 
promises, as in the ex post or “will” conception of contract, often 
associated with Charles Fried.10  A competing theory is that an 
ideal contract law is best constructed instrumentally, in service 
to the forward-looking demands of wealth maximization,11 as the 
ex ante conception of contract would demand.  To take another 
 
10 See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CON-
TRACTUAL OBLIGATION (2d ed. 2015) (defending the autonomy or will theory of 
contract law). See also Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24, 43 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (distinguishing be-
tween the ex ante and ex post accounts of contract law). 
11 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (9th ed. 2014). See 
generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination 
of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). 
2020] MAXIMIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7 
example, in the context of accidents, tort law is ideally under-
stood as justified by the backward-looking value of corrective 
justice,12 or as instantiating roughly optimal deterrence, so as to 
efficiently reduce, spread, and distribute accident costs.13  
The ongoing debate over the structure of private law is no 
longer strictly confined to a dispute over wealth maximization on 
the one hand and autonomy or corrective justice on the other.  
Recently, the details of a third approach have been discussed, 
namely, a distributive account of private law.14  Scholars have 
addressed the question of whether the private law ought to 
embody normative values beyond wealth maximization or 
autonomy and corrective justice—values often associated with 
taxation15—and considered notions of equality and distributive 
justice.16  Such scholars have also addressed the further question 
of whether or not distribution through private law rules can be 
 
12 See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 54 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, THE 
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE] (discussing and defending the principle of corrective 
justice); Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1814–15 (2004) (holding that the private law—tort, contract, 
property, and unjust enrichment—should bear an independence of distributive 
justice, but is (also) limited by public justice). Cf. George P. Fletcher, Corrective 
Justice for Moderns, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1669 (1993) (reviewing JULES 
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992)) (“Corrective justice is not immanent in the 
tort system . . . . Nor does it provide a bulwark against economic and regulatory 
reasoning in tort law. [Further, i]t is not an absolute demand of justice and 
morality.”). 
13 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 28 (1970). 
14 See Rakoff, supra note 2, at 737; Kordana & Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract 
Law, supra note 2, at 599; Kordana & Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat, supra note 2, 
at 1280; Kordana & Blankfein Tabachnick, The Rawlsian View of Private Ordering, 
supra note 2, at 288; Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 105, 105–06 (2008); Josse Klijnsma, Contract Law as Fairness, 28 
RATIO JURIS 68, 70 (2015); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy 
Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy 
Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 340 (1993); Elizabeth 
Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L.J. 78, 87 (2019) (discussing 
equality and economic opportunity in the context of “private” associations); see 
generally Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 8 YALE L.J. 
472 (1980). 
15 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 3 (2002). 
16 See generally Kronman, supra note 14; Kordana & Tabachnick, Rawls and 
Contract Law, supra note 2; Kordana & Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat, supra note 
2; Kordana & Blankfein Tabachnick, The Rawlsian View of Private Ordering, supra 
note 2; Bagchi, supra note 14; Klijnsma, supra note 14; Rasmussen, supra note 14; 
Warren, supra note 14. 
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accomplished efficiently, and if not, whether the rules of the 
private law should continue to answer only to the values of 
wealth maximization.  This leaves all distributive goals, however 
egalitarian, solely to the domain of the system of income taxation 
and transfer.17 
Private law judicial opinions have long been predicated on a 
concern for equality and distributive justice,18 but leading legal 
scholars have been skeptical.19  Such scholars have understood 
concerns over equality addressed to private law rules as well-
intended, if misplaced in common law.20  In this view of distrib-
utive and economic justice, reasons of both normativity21 and 
efficiency22 demand that a concern for economic equality is best 
relegated to the narrow domain of taxation and tax policy, as 
opposed to the common law.  However, recent pathbreaking legal 
 
17 LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 35–37 
(2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? 
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 
J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 821 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules 
Favor the Poor?]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less 
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 
(1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient]. 
18 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079–80 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(Wright, J.) (enforcing an implied warranty of habitability and discussing unequal 
bargaining power between landlords and comparatively less well-off tenants whose 
home-rental options may be constrained by race or social and economic class-based 
discrimination); Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, 
J.) (affirming liability on a manufacturer on the grounds that the “jury could 
reasonably find that there exist people who are employed as meat grinders and who 
do not know . . . that it is feasible to reduce the risk with safety guards . . . [and] that 
the grinders should be used . . . with the guards”). 
19 See Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 17, at 
822–25; Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 17, at 
667–68. 
20 See Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 17, at 
822–23; Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 17, at 
667–68. 
21 See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 14, at 500–01 (describing Rawls as providing a 
problematic account of political liberalism that limits the domain of distributive 
justice to taxation and transfer, but arguing, contra Rawls, that contract law is 
properly understood as a locus of distributive justice); Liam B. Murphy, Institutions 
and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 252, 259 (1998) (noting that 
for Rawls, the domain of distributive justice was mainly taxation and transfer). See 
also Ripstein, supra note 12, at 1814–15 (“Justice requires that private law—tort, 
contract, property, and unjust enrichment—have a certain kind of independence. . . . 
[W]e must also avoid being sucked into the idea that relations between private 
individuals must be subordinated to distributive concerns.”). 
22 See Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 17, at 
821; Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 17, at 
669. 
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scholarship has come to forcefully reject this view, despite long-
standing entrenchment.23 
This scholarship has recast the role that legal rules play in 
achieving overarching ideals of equality and distributive justice.24  
Leading legal scholars have explicitly endorsed a broad role for 
 
23 See Revesz, supra note 2, at 1490–92 (attributing this long-standing or “domi-
nant view” to Kaplow and Shavell, but challenging this “dominant view, arguing 
that it suffers from two serious practical shortcomings”). Although they argue that 
“the efficiency of regulations should not be compromised for distributional concerns, 
Kaplow and Shavell do not claim that distributional concerns are unimportant. 
Instead, they maintain that whatever preferences our society might have for 
distribution should best be addressed through the income tax system, not the 
regulatory process.” Id. See also Blankfein-Tabachnick & Kordana, Kaplow and 
Shavell, supra note 2, at 8; Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distrib-
utive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1062, 1111–12 (2016) 
(noting that “the K&S result and the policy advice have become the conventional 
wisdom,” but objecting to the Kaplow and Shavell position for taking inadequate 
account of transaction costs); Liscow, supra note 2, at 2482 (“[L]egal rules may be 
more efficient than income taxes at redistributing income from the rich to the poor.”); 
Dimick, supra note 2, at 40; Geistfeld, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing distribution and 
tort law); Jeremy Waldron, Locating Distribution, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 281–82 
(2003) (discussing Rawlsianism in light of Kaplow and Shavell’s choice of social 
welfare function); JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS: THE BASIS OF 
HUMAN EQUALITY 9–10 (2017) (discussing the surface-level equality required of 
economic and legal institutions as reflecting a deeper commitment to human 
equality). For an early property entitlement–based criticism of Kaplow and Shavell 
and a discussion of what have come to be called pre-distributive entitlement rules, 
see Kordana & Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law, and Distributive Justice, 
supra note 2, at 163. 
Kaplow and Shavell appear to assume the existence of an underlying 
system of property ownership and free markets. [The] issue, however, is the 
very question of the form that property rules should take; that is, we are 
interested in the question of whether the equity-oriented values that dif-
fering theorists hold are best met through tax and transfer, or through (in 
part) the rules of property law. Thus, it is not clear that Kaplow and 
Shavell’s discussion, which compares tax and transfer to a tort rule (in iso-
lation) and concludes that tax and transfer is superior in terms of economic 
efficiency, would (also) apply to the question of the underlying set of 
property rules. 
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Steven K. Vogel, Opinion, Elizabeth Warren 
Wants To Stop Inequality Before It Starts, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 3, 2019, 9:03 PM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/opinion/elizabeth-warren-economic-policy-
democrats.html [https://perma.cc/TCU4-SBZ3] (“Pre-distribution is less costly than 
redistribution . . . . The pre-distribution agenda . . . is about shaping markets to al-
locate returns from economic activity more fairly in the first place rather than trying 
to correct inequities after the fact.”). 
24 See generally Scheffler, supra note 2 (discussing the relationship between 
distributive justice and private law). See also FREEMAN, supra note 2, at 168 (“My 
position is that Rawls conceived the principles of justice as applying directly to the 
regulation of laws in terms of contractual agreements and individuals’ use, control, 
and disposal of . . . property.”).  
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distributive values in the construction of non-tax and transfer 
legal rules, arguing, for example, that the regulatory rules of 
administrative agencies—in addition to the rules of taxation and 
transfer—may serve as the proper domain of distributive justice.25  
More expansively still, this growing literature has endorsed a 
distributive role for the private law in bankruptcy,26 contract,27 
property,28 tort,29 and trusts and estates.30  An important paradigm 
shift appears to be upon the legal academy.  The scholarly refu-
tation of the narrow conception of distributive justice—as 
applicable only to rules of taxation and transfer—has seemingly 
spawned a renaissance in legal scholarship surrounding a dis-
tributive conception of private law rules. 
B. Conceptions of Intellectual Property 
Against this backdrop of private law scholarship, debate over 
the normative structure of intellectual property and the correct 
principles that serve to justify it is also underway.31  Here, there 
 
25 See Revesz, supra note 2, at 1492.  
26 See generally Kordana & Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law, and Distrib-
utive Justice, supra note 2; Rasmussen, supra note 14; Warren, supra note 14. 
27 See generally Kronman, supra note 14; Kordana & Tabachnick, Rawls and 
Contract Law, supra note 2; Scheffler, supra note 2; FREEMAN, supra note 2. 
28 See generally Blankfein-Tabachnick & Kordana, Kaplow and Shavell and the 
Priority of Income Taxation and Transfer, supra note 2. See also Kordana & 
Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law, and Distributive Justice, supra note 2; Craig 
Rotherham, Property and Power: The Judicial Redistribution of Proprietary Rights, 
in PRIVATE LAW AND POWER 107 (Kit Barker et al. eds.) (2017); Liscow, supra note 2; 
Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 471 (2015) (discussing 
property law and how alterations to the structure of property entitlement may im-
prove the welfare of the poor); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property 
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (2007) (arguing that “property outlaws” have 
played a role in a just “evolution and transfer of property entitlements”). 
29 Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for 
Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 799–800 (2000) (defending 
the setting of liability in a more egalitarian direction than optimal deterrence would 
have it in the context of wealth maximization). 
30 See Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual 
Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1795–96 (2014) (discussing the constitutionality of 
perpetual trusts and aspects of the question of intergenerational wealth). See 
generally Matthew Harding, Trustees’ Powers and Social Justice, in PRIVATE LAW 
AND POWER, supra note 28, at 137 (discussing the distributive function of trustee 
powers). 
31 See generally MERGES, supra note 3, at 2; Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 4, 
at 1343–44 (discussing the principled incompatibility among foundational principles 
and midlevel principles of intellectual property); Robert P. Merges, Foundations and 
Principles Redux: A Reply to Professor Blankfein-Tabachnick, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 
1361, 1361 (2013) (discussing the compatibility of foundations and midlevel prin-
ciples and the possibility of an overlapping consensus among them). See also Robert 
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are diverse views.  Some argue, for example, that intellectual prop-
erty is justified in terms of protecting the general value of human 
expression even beyond the context of copyright, and in the con-
text of patent as well.32 
Another important view holds that intellectual property’s 
monopolistic rules serve a distributive function, but one that pro-
vides mainly for equality of opportunity.33  But like private law 
scholarship in general, intellectual property scholars tend to dis-
agree over how to best understand intellectual property.  Some 
believe intellectual property is best understood as a system of 
private law rules justified from backward-looking notions of 
desert or meritorious labor.34  Others are of the opinion that in-
tellectual property’s construction of monopolistic protection via 
patent and copyright protection—if it should exist at all—is best 
justified by a complex system of forward-looking incentives to 
creation.  On balance, such rules would improve public welfare by 
serving as a needed solution to a public goods problem.35 
1. Backward-Looking Conceptions of Intellectual Property 
As discussed, and consistent with the general divide in private 
law scholarship, some intellectual property theorists conceive of 
the subject as justified by backward-looking notions of merit.  At 
work here is the idea that one ought to have a measure of legal 
 
P. Merges, The Relationship Between Foundations and Principles in IP Law, 49 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 957, 957–58 (2012) (further discussing foundational principles and 
midlevel principles); Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. 
REV. 1328, 1328 (2015) (defending a welfarist or utilitarian account of intellectual 
property in substantial disagreement with Merges’s deontic account); Robert P. 
Merges, Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 681, 681–82, 
681 n.1 (2016) (objecting to Lemley’s welfarist account of intellectual property); 
Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Co-
llective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1180 (2008) [hereinafter Merges, Locke 
for the Masses] (discussing merit-based or backward-looking normative accounts of 
intellectual property); Eric R Claeys, Intellectual Property and Practical Reason, 9 
JURIS. 251, 251–52 (2018) (defending backward or deontic accounts of intellectual 
property). 
32 See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 
98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1749–50 (2012) (discussing “expression” as a candidate for the 
justification of intellectual property, interestingly, in both patent and copyright). 
33 See Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 516 (2016) (discussing the role copyright law might play 
in equal opportunity in achieving distributive justice). 
34 See MERGES, supra note 3, at 31–67 (discussing Lockean justifications for in-
tellectual property). See generally Merges, Locke for the Masses, supra note 31; 
Claeys, supra note 31. 
35 See POSNER, supra note 11, at 40–48; Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 326. 
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control over that which one creates through honest industry.  
Intellectual property law provides such entitlement or ownership 
through limited, monopolistic protection of the fruits of one’s 
honest industry and creation.  Such theorists, often of Lockean 
inspiration, understand an ideal intellectual property law as 
embodying so-called “natural” or pre-institutional or prepolitical 
rights to ownership, and conceive of intellectual property as being 
drawn from deontic or rights-based, backward-looking principles 
of ownership.36  These theorists conceptualize intellectual property 
as a sector of private law, in line with other backward-looking 
conceptions, including, for example, the corrective justice concep-
tion of tort and the ex post conception of contract law, often 
described as the “will” or “autonomy” theory.37 
2. Forward-Looking or Consequentialist Conceptions of 
Intellectual Property 
Alternatively, the main subject of this Article is the forward-
looking, typically utilitarian, welfare- or wealth-maximizing ap-
proach to intellectual property.38  This approach is skeptical of 
“natural” rights to ownership and instead advocates for an 
instrumentalist approach to intellectual property.39  Utilitarian or 
“law and economics” scholars conceive of monopolistic intellectual 
property protection, if it is to exist, as a complex set of incentives 
to innovation created through the construction of artificial monopo-
listic legal rules.  These incentives are crafted so as to maximize 
utility, or net-aggregate wealth or welfare, by serving as a solu-
tion to a public goods problem. 
In this view, often associated with William Landes and Richard 
Posner, and arguably described in the United States Constitu-
tion, the sole purpose of intellectual property is utility or wealth 
maximization.40  Intellectual property rules incentivize innovation 
 
36 See Merges, Locke for the Masses, supra note 31, at 1180. See generally 
Claeys, supra note 31. 
37 See generally COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 12; FRIED, 
supra note 10. See also SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, 
MORALITY, AND THE LAW 48 (2014) (discussing promises and contract law). 
38 See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 326; Lemley, supra note 31, at 1340–
44. 
39 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 1338–40; Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 4, 
at 1352–53; POSNER, supra note 11, at 402. 
40 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11 (2003); Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 325–
26. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (describing promotion of “Science and useful 
Arts”). 
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through the promise of economic reward achieved through time-
limited monopolistic control.  But, even among those who advo-
cate for monopolistic protection, there is disagreement over the 
correct structure and breadth of monopolistic protection41 in both 
copyright42 and patent,43  and also in the question of whether copy-
right and patent ought to serve different forward-looking 
purposes.  Under certain assumptions, others observe that the lack 
of monopolistic protection itself potentially serves as sufficient 
incentive to creation.44  And some defend a nuanced or mixed 
system recognizing and leveraging the important trade-offs 
among various competing conceptions of intellectual property.  In 
advocating for such a mixed system, such thinkers creatively 
bifurcate the “incentive” and “allocative” components of intel-
lectual property and creatively draw taxation and transfer policy 
into innovation policy without completely abandoning monopo-
listic protection.45 
For this forward-looking approach, the chief question 
surrounding intellectual property’s monopolistic protection is 
whether or not the deadweight loss associated with monopolistic 
rules, that ex post defeat of would-be “win-win” economic 
transactions, is positively outweighed by the upside gained from 
would-be innovation ex ante.  This form of reasoning applies to 
both patent and copyright.  Importantly, in this model, monopo-
listic intellectual property rules, if they are to exist at all, are 
artificial legal constructions, derivative of external principles.  
Such monopolistic rules—however initially inefficient they may 
appear—are justified, if at all, through their all-things-
considered instrumental service to the aims or goals of utility or 
wealth maximization.46 
 
41 See generally Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 6; INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL 
PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 6. 
42 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 321 (1970). 
43 See generally Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 6, at 533–34; INCENTIVES 
FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 6; Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3; Hemel 
& Ouellette, supra note 5, at 310–12. 
44 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation 
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1717–18 (2006) 
(discussing the idea that the lack of copyright protection can, itself, in the context of 
the fashion industry, give rise to incentives to innovation). 
45 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3, at 547–49, 572–73; see also Hemel & 
Ouellette, supra note 5, at 321–25. 
46 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 40, at 300. 
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3. Empiricism and Faith 
Recently, eminent intellectual property scholar Mark Lemley 
has taken a position in favor of the forward-looking approach, 
arguing that intellectual property—in both patent and copy-
right—is at its core the application of the utility- or wealth-
maximizing principle47 to a set of changing empirical facts.48  
Lemley not only advocates for the utilitarian—or, as he describes 
it, an “empirical” conception of intellectual property—but he also 
goes further.  Lemley is committed to the view that intellectual 
property, as a positive matter, is utilitarian; but, he also 
maintains that his backward-looking or deontic competitors’ 
normative accounts of intellectual property are not only 
incorrect, but worse still, “faith-based.”  For Lemley, such norma-
tive theorists are not only wrong about theory and the positive 
law, but also are significantly misguided.  Backward-looking or 
deontic conceptions of intellectual property, he maintains, are 
simply too obscure to play a foundational role in law—
particularly a body of law so strongly implicated in innovation 
and, in turn, human welfare.  So, Lemley not only defends the 
forward-looking incentive based account, but also raises signifi-
cant skepticism toward nonutilitarian models.49 
 Lemley mounts his attack not only against Lockean-
libertarian and Lockean-liberal accounts of intellectual property, 
but also against other moderate rights-based accounts, so-called 
“midlevel” principle conceptions of intellectual property, and 
liberal egalitarian accounts associated with Rawlsianism.50  Such 
 
47 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 1330 (“IP rights are a form of government 
regulation of the free market designed to serve a useful social end—encouraging 
innovation and creation.”). 
48 Id. at 1331 (“The fact that IP is government regulation of the marketplace 
doesn’t mean it is a bad thing. Many regulations are desirable, and I think IP rights 
of some form are among them. But it does mean that it is not an inherently good 
thing. In a market-based economy, regulation requires some cost-benefit justification 
before we accept it.”); see also id. at 1334 (“The relationship between patents and 
innovation seems to depend greatly on industry; some evidence suggests that the 
patent system is worth the cost in the biomedical industries but not elsewhere.”). 
49 Id. at 1337–38 (“I call this retreat from evidence faith-based IP, both because 
adherents are taking the validity of the IP system on faith and because the rationale 
for doing so is a form of religious belief. The adherents of this new religion believe in 
IP. They don’t believe it is better for the world than other systems, or that it 
encourages more innovation. Rather, they believe in IP as an end in itself—that IP is 
some kind of prepolitical right to which inventors and creators are entitled.”). 
50 Id. at 1338–39 (describing a fallacious form of reasoning—“I made it and so I 
own it”—and alleging that his “faith-based” interlocutors themselves attribute the 
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midlevel conceptions include those associated, for example, with 
Robert Merges.51  Following the midlevel principle account of tort, 
for example, the corrective justice conception,52 a midlevel princi-
ple account of intellectual property, has been vigorously defended 
in the literature.53  Such deontic accounts allege that midlevel 
principles, such as the principles of proportionality, autonomy, 
utility, and nonremoval, serve to unify intellectual property by 
connecting foundational theory to intellectual property doctrine.54  
Midlevel accounts are not without objection: it is not clear, for 
example, that competing normative foundations that contain 
conception of ownership can be shown to be consistent with 
midlevel principles, which embody an opposing conception of 
ownership.55  But this is not Lemley’s concern.  His objection to 
such accounts of intellectual property is that they embody a form 
of normative reasoning that he finds untenable, or “faith-
based.”56  So, for Lemley, the objection to such midlevel accounts 
is not the internal conflict but rather the fact that such accounts 
appeal to a non-empirical framework—one that invokes, for him, 
obscure notions of moral rights and moral reasoning. 
4. Empiricism and the Distributive Approach 
But, again, as in private law theory generally, there is a 
third possibility in intellectual property; this is a possibility 
which Lemley remarks upon only quickly—and perhaps surpris-
ingly dismissively given his distaste for metaphysically obscure 
or backward-looking, deontic accounts57—namely, the possibility 
of a distributive or Rawlsian account of intellectual property.  
True, distributive accounts of the private law, as argued above, 
 
erroneous proposition to “John Locke, or Hegel, or, more recently, Rawls.” Lemley also 
skeptically argues that “those theories have more than their fair share of problems”). 
51 Id. at 1336–38. 
52 See the sources and accompanying text cited supra note 12 (detailing 
justifications and criticisms of the tort-law conception of “corrective justice”). 
53 MERGES, supra note 3, at 139–60 (explaining and defending midlevel 
principles as “basic concepts that tie together a number of discrete and detailed 
doctrines, rules, and practices in a particular legal field”). 
54 See id. 
55 See Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 4, at 1323 (“If the correct foundational 
theories exert no controlling force over midlevel principles, midlevel principles would 
seem, at best, to help explain, predict, or even control, as opposed to justify IP law.”). 
56 Lemley, supra note 31, at 1337–38. 
57 Id. at 1338–39. 
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are not without objection.58  But Lemley’s skepticism is distinct, 
based neither in efficiency59 nor upon a tax and transfer range 
limitation imposed upon distributive principles.60 
Here again, Lemley’s suspicion would appear to derive from 
his general skepticism of normative reasoning.61  His concern with 
distributive theories presumably is one of mere faith in the 
acceptance of normative accounts of property.  But this suspicion 
may be viewed as curious and arguably misplaced in the context 
of distributive theories.  It is notable that Rawlsianism too rejects 
certain aspects of metaphysical—or, in Lemley’s preferred lan-
guage, “faith-based”—thinking surrounding deontic or backward-
looking conceptions of property.  Rawlsianism importantly, and 
self-consciously, bears a form of “property skepticism,” akin at a 
certain level to Lemley’s.  Rawlsianism prominently rejects all 
pre-institutional or prepolitical property constructions and, like 
Lemley, is wholly instrumentalist about property; where proper-
ty rights are to exist, they are derived instrumentally from 
distributive principles.  This third distributive approach shares, if 
narrowly, in certain aspects of Lemley’s skeptical concerns, at 
least pertaining to Lockean or pre-institutional property con-
structions.62  Lemley, however, appears to have deeper normative 
 
58 Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 17, at 821; 
Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 17, at 669. 
59 Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 17, at 821; 
Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient, supra note 17, at 669. 
60 See generally Kronman, supra note 14; see also Murphy, supra note 21 at 251–
54 (both noting, for example, that for Rawls, the domain of distributive justice is 
limited to taxation and transfer). 
61 Lemley, supra note 31, at 1338–39. 
62 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 275–76 (describing ownership, as defined by 
distributive principles, as “a just scheme [that] gives each person his due: that is, it 
allots to each what he is entitled to as defined by the scheme itself”); Thomas Nagel, 
Rawls and Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 62, 68 (Samuel 
Freeman ed., 2003) (“Th[e] rejection of economic freedom as a value in itself is one 
feature of Rawls’s view that has attracted opposition . . . .”); Kordana & Tabachnick, 
Rawls and Contract Law, supra note 2, at 614 (“Importantly, given Rawls’s post-
institutional conception of property, taxation is not a matter of redistribution, as it is 
typically understood in our public lexicon, but rather a matter of distribution. For 
Rawlsians, post-tax incomes represent distributive shares that are justified by the 
overarching distributive scheme (the difference principle). Market outcomes have no 
independent normative significance and are an irrelevant baseline for the purposes 
of economic distribution in a Rawlsian scheme.”); MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, 
at 31–33 (criticizing what they call “everyday libertarianism” in the context of pretax 
income, a view they believe embodies a confusion over the distinction between dis-
tribution and redistribution concerning property and taxation and contrasting that 
view with a preferred distributive approach, in line with Rawls). Although Murphy 
and Nagel discuss taxation, an analogous point can be made concerning property: in 
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concerns beyond a healthy skepticism toward prepolitical ac-
counts of property, whether derived from reason or God, as Locke 
argued.63  Lemley’s strident form of skepticism, if taken seriously, 
would have to apply equally well to both the acceptance and 
derivation of the wealth- or utility-maximization principles, as it 
would to distributive principles.  At a first cut, both camps invoke 
principles that maximize value—whether welfare, wealth, or an 
objective index of primary goods—over a set of empirical or 
factual features of the world.  Perhaps this is what Lemley may 
have in mind: once the utility- or wealth-maximizing principle is 
accepted or derived, one simply needs an accounting of the facts 
to apply the principle. 
But the wealth-maximization principle itself is no less 
metaphysical—or faith-based—than are other distributive or 
maximizing principles.64  But, these two types of principles can be 
seen as being on something of a methodological par, if incor-
porating different goals and axiologies.  Indeed, economists often 
derive the wealth- or welfare-maximization principle from a 
social choice scenario nearly identical to Rawls’s original position 
 
the context of distributive principles, like Rawls’s, property entitlement, including 
patent, is the outcome of the scheme of rules selected by the principles and is in no 
way a starting place. This view of taxation and property has a certain affinity with 
aspects of Lemley’s conception of intellectual property; one cannot just start with 
ownership of creation as given any more than one can start with pretax income as 
given. 
There is no market without government and no government without 
taxes; and what type of market there is depends on laws and policy deci-
sions that governments must make. In the absence of a legal system 
supported by taxes, there couldn’t be money, banks, corporations, stock 
exchanges, patents, or a modern market economy—none of the institutions 
that make possible the existence of almost all contemporary forms of 
income and wealth. 
It is therefore logically impossible that people should have any kind of 
entitlement to all their pretax income. All they can be entitled to is what 
they would be left with after taxes under a legitimate system, supported by 
legitimate taxation—and this shows that we cannot evaluate the legitimacy 
of taxes by reference to pretax income. 
Id. at 32–33. 
63 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18 (C.B. Macpherson 
ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). 
64 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42–43 (Erin Kelly ed., 
Belknap Press 2001) (“[First Principle:] Each person has the same indefeasible claim 
to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with 
the same scheme of liberties for all; and [Second Principle:] Social and economic 
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, 
they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle).”). 
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(“OP”), from which his principles of justice are derived.65  If Lemley 
willingly accepts the utility- or wealth-maximizing principles as 
sufficiently non-faith-based, even given his normative skepticism, 
it would appear at pain of inconsistency that he would be 
estopped from objecting to distributive principles maximizing the 
position of the least well-off, at least along the dimension of their 
being hopelessly faith-based.  Indeed, Rawlsianism bears a certain 
level of skepticism surrounding prepolitical or pre-institutional 
property constructions of its own, in a respect at home with at 
least some of the tenor of Lemley’s concerns.66 
 
65 See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the 
Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 434–35 (1953) (describing an early, 
pre-Rawls, invocation of the “veil of ignorance” in deriving and developing 
utilitarianism). See also RAWLS, supra note 64, at 14, 18 (The “original position” is 
an idealized social-choice scenario, in which hypothetical persons select political and 
economic principles, so as to maximize self-interest under conditions of imperfect 
knowledge, from behind a so-called “veil of ignorance.”). 
66 The Rawlsian difference principle is the second of two lexically ordered 
principles; as such, its domain is constrained by the prior liberty principle and the 
opportunity principle. So considerations other than economic distribution are at 
stake in IP matters. That is, one might erroneously, in my estimation, argue on the 
basis of Rawls’s first principle of justice that IP law might be constructed as a series 
of liberty options, in a manner likely objectionable to Lemley. But importantly, for 
Rawls, all economic and property baselines are constructed by the second principle 
of justice’s demand that the position of the least well-off be maximized. This is where 
Rawls’s property skepticism lies. Importantly, Rawlsianism bears absolutely no 
commitment to prepolitical or pre-institutional property or economic constructions of 
the form to which Lemley so strenuously objects. See Kordana & Tabachnick, Rawls 
and Contract Law, supra note 2, at 598. The details of ownership and control are 
constructed in service to the maximizing demand of the second principle of justice. 
So for Rawls, the structure of innovation policy is an instrumentalist construction—
the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis—methodologically analogous to Lemley’s 
approach, if admittedly under the control of a distinct maximand. See id. at 609 
(advancing the “ ‘High’ Rawlsian” position with regard to property, ownership, asset 
allocation and all economic constructions). Importantly, Rawlsianism is committed 
to a certain measure of deontology but not at the level of legal rule construction or 
innovation policy. Instead, Kantianism informs the construction of the original 
position, not the application of the two principles of justice, which in turn constructs 
legal and political institutions, inclusive of the innovation policy. That the two 
principles of justice are consequentialist in form, if nonutilitarian, is a point Thomas 
Nagel (too) has made clear. Thomas Nagel, Justice and Nature, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 303, 306 (1997) (“Rawls’s approach is theoretically deontological in founda-
tion, though its development leads in a consequentialist (but nonutilitarian) 
direction.”); see also CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & A. JOHN SIMMONS, IS THERE 
A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW? 156 n.38 (2005) (noting that “the natural duties actually 
discussed by Rawls are not ‘natural’ in any very strong sense, but are only the 
‘post[-]institutional’ moral duties that original position reasoners would select to 
bind themselves in their subsequent interactions” and that a discussion departing 
from this post-institutional account “may seem to be aimed at a Rawls who is more 
Kantian than Rawls actually wished to be”). 
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5. The Third Distributive Possibility 
Although intellectual property rules are typically understood 
as derived from either backward-looking deontic or forward-
looking utilitarian or wealth-maximizing principles, there is an 
alternative, if under-appreciated, forward-looking possibility—
that is, a distributive approach aimed at maximizing the position 
of the least well-off, as opposed to utility or net-aggregate wealth, 
as found in utilitarianism and law and economics, respectively.  
This approach may serve as an appealing middle ground for 
those skeptical of the idea of prepolitical or natural rights in 
property or for those who find the distributive flaws in utilitari-
anism or wealth-maximizing approaches fatally objectionable.67  
At the same time this approach is, happily for some, mercifully 
less metaphysically ambitious than its above described deontic or 
backward-looking pre-institutional competitors. 
Methodologically, such a contemporary egalitarian approach 
to intellectual property and private law generally begins with a 
set of deontic or Kantian assumptions concerning human 
freedom and equality68 that construct a social choice scenario: the 
Rawlsian OP.69  From this idealized social-choice scenario, hypo-
thetical representatives select political and economic principles, 
so as to maximize self-interest under conditions of imperfect 
knowledge, from behind a so-called “veil of ignorance.”70  What 
emerges are the so-called two principles of justice,71 taken to 
govern the “basic structure” of society.72  The first principle of 
justice, the liberty principle, governs constitutional essentials.  
The liberty principle takes lexical priority over the second princi-
ple of justice that embodies the so-called “difference principle,” 
which demands that the economic system—inclusive of the 
details of property and ownership, taxation and transfer, the law 
of contract and economic exchange, and business organization, 
among others—be organized so as to maximize the position of the 
least well-off,73 subject to an equal opportunity constraint.74 
 
67 Rawls’s aim was to displace utilitarianism by constructing an outcome-oriented 
theory that does not admit of the well-understood distributive flaws associated with 
utilitarianism. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 94–97.  
68 RAWLS, supra note 64, at 18. 
69 Id. at 15, 18. 
70 Id. at 18; RAWLS, supra note 4, at 136–39; Harsanyi, supra note 65, at 434–35. 
71 RAWLS, supra note 64, at 42–43.  
72 Id. at 8–10. 
73 In light of the argument above concerning the “high Rawlsian” position that 
the details of ownership and economic constructions are properly understood as 
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For contemporary egalitarians drawn to the Rawlsian 
difference principle, maximizing the economic position of the 
least well-off members of society is natural when thinking of 
intellectual property and innovation policy in distributive terms.  
Innovations’ social impact is breathtaking, from life-saving and 
welfare-enhancing pharmaceuticals, to video game technology, to 
questions concerning the ownership of fashion design.  Compet-
ing or potentially conflicting schemes of legal rules constructing 
intellectual property and innovation policy—much like taxation 
or bankruptcy policy, inclusive of rules governing the ordering of 
creditors over, say, firm or job preservation75—have differential 
impacts on (in)equality, the position of the least well-off and, 
importantly, the social basis of self-respect.76  The Rawlsian dif-
ference principle, subject to the above-stated lexically prior 
constraints, operates over its specified domain analogously to the 
forward-looking utility or wealth-maximization principle77 in con-
structing the details of property ownership and control.78  For such 
contemporary egalitarians, attention to the structure of the 
construction of ex ante incentives to innovation, as well as any ex 
post legal rules defining ownership and control, would be crucial 
to maximizing the position of the least well-off; in this, there may 
be somewhat more affinity with Lemley’s position than his 
remarks reveal.79 
 
second-principle constructions governed by the difference principle, the first princi-
ple of justice in constructing equal liberty is, in the main, silent with regard to the 
details of property ownership and exchange. See MERGES, supra note 3, at 104–05 
(noting that for Rawls, “ ‘personal property’ is not an expansive concept” and “a broad 
right to property is not among the essential liberties”).  
74 See Hughes & Merges, supra note 33, at 540–42 (arguing the opportunity 
principle might construct some monopolistic protection). 
75 See Warren, supra note 14, at 354–55 (conceiving of bankruptcy as 
instantiating concerns for fairness, for example, labor and firm preservation); 
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1850 (conceiving of bankruptcy as maximizing wealth); 
see also THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 11–19 
(1986) (conceiving of bankruptcy as mainly a solution to a collective action problem 
or common pool problem); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The 
Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 919, 948–62 (1991) (discussing competing accounts of bankruptcy 
theory and policy). 
76 See RAWLS, supra note 64, at 59. 
77 See Thomas W. Pogge, Three Problems with Contractarian-Consequentialist 
Ways of Assessing Social Institutions, 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 241, 244 (1995) 
(describing Rawlsianism as forward-looking and consequentialist). 
78 FREEMAN, supra note 2, at 45. 
79 Lemley, supra note 31, at 1338–39. 
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Interestingly, despite the paradigm shift in distributive 
thinking over the private law,80 there remains little consensus 
over the structure of intellectual property or the role innovation 
policy ought to play in such a distributive account of economic 
justice.  Yet, systems of legal rules insufficiently attentive to innova-
tion policy will fail in their mandate of providing the greatest 
possible advantage to the least well-off.  The relationship, how-
ever, between this account of distributive and economic justice, 
intellectual property, and innovation policy remains incompletely 
understood; the scholarship surrounding the topic is conflicting 
and appears to reveal an inchoate understanding surrounding 
maximizing theories of innovation policy in general.81 
Importantly, forward-looking maximizing theories, whether 
Rawlsian and aimed at the position of the least well-off or drawn 
from law and economics and aimed at net-aggregate wealth or 
welfare, must construct innovation policy that finds a home in 
the context of a complete scheme of optimal legal rules that are 
constructed, instrumentally, in service of the maximizing de-
mand of respective external principles.  The following discussion, 
initially drawn from within legal doctrine, and then more 
expansively drawn from outside traditional intellectual property 
doctrine, is instructive in showing the relationship between ex-
ternal principles and intellectual property and innovation policy. 
In the context of intense scholarly debate, Part II holds that 
egalitarian distributive principles, aimed at maximizing the 
position of the least well-off, operate in important respects that 
are analogous to wealth- or welfare-maximizing principles.  
Drawing upon this analysis, Part II of this Article concludes that, 
where external principles bear maximizing components govern-
ing property entitlements, traditional or conventional boundaries 
 
80 See generally Scheffler, supra note 2; FREEMAN, supra note 2; Revesz, supra 
note 2; Kordana & Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law, and Distributive Justice, 
supra note 2; Rasmussen, supra note 14; Warren, supra note 14. 
81 Consider the widely disparate views surrounding a distributive account of 
intellectual property. MERGES, supra note 3, at 132 (viewing intellectual property’s 
monopolistic protection in isolation of taxation); Shavell & Van Ypersele, supra note 
6, at 544 (discussing a system that involves an innovator’s choice between intel-
lectual property and prizes, but failing to account for the full cost of taxation’s 
deadweight loss in the model). See generally INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC 
HEALTH, supra note 6 (writing in a Rawlsian vein and concluding that taxation and 
prizes are the correct innovation policy); Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 3; Hemel & 
Ouellette, supra note 5 (advancing an innovatively mixed conception invoking a 
range of incentives and discussing distributive justice-oriented concerns, but in the 
context of a wealth-maximizing approach to innovation policy).  
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internal to intellectual property are untenable.  The following sec-
tions argue further that, in the context of such principles, the 
distinction between intellectual property rules and so-called 
background rules cannot be sustained.  Where maximizing prin-
ciples are brought to bear, intellectual property rules cannot be 
methodologically distinguished from non-intellectual property 
legal rules, for example, those traditionally associated with 
taxation and budget expenditure or bankruptcy. 
II.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S INTERNAL DOCTRINE 
A. The Patent–Copyright Divide 
In light of the preceding arguments, consider traditional 
intellectual property doctrine.  Intellectual property doctrine of-
fers monopolistic legal protection over the purportedly distinct 
domains of copyright and patent.  On one hand, subject to specified 
constraints and balancing tests, copyright law offers monopolistic 
protection to works that tend to be characterized as the original 
expression of an idea; for example, computer programs and 
artistic or literary works.82  On the other hand, subject to meet-
ing various doctrinal criterion—for example, novelty, utility, and 
non-obviousness—patent law permits monopolistic protection for 
a range of innovations that one might describe as inventive or 
utilitarian.83  Copyright and patent law ostensibly pertain to dis-
parate domains of innovation; correspondingly, the two are gov-
erned by differing sets of doctrinal rules.84  Notably, patent 
protection requires a higher and costlier threshold for monopo-
listic protection than does copyright.85  The doctrinal divide between 
the original expression of an idea on one hand, and a more 
utilitarian invention on the other, appears at first brush to make 
good sense.  But the dichotomy can be deceptively simple; human 
 
82 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 37. 
83 Id. at 168–70, 207, 233–34; 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2018). 
84 1 MENELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 37 (“Although the copyright and patent 
laws flow from the same constitutional basis and share the same general approach—
statutorily created monopolies to foster progress—they feature different elements 
and rights, reflecting the very different fields of human ingenuity that they seek to 
encourage.”). 
85 See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 86–87 (6th ed. 
2014) (describing the higher threshold associated with patent, as compared with 
copyright). “Unlike a copyright, a patentable invention must demonstrate consid-
erably more than originality and must meet the rigorous tests of novelty and 
nonobviousness.” Id. 
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innovation does not always pattern the doctrinal dichotomy.  
Upon reflection, the two are not mutually exclusive, and cor-
respondingly it is not always obvious whether a work should be 
viewed as inventive or expressive.  Further still, there can be 
significant overlap between the two; works can be evaluated 
along multiple dimensions, creating the possibility that they 
admit of expressive and inventive aspects.  So, the patent versus 
copyright divide in intellectual property doctrine, however clean 
at the doctrinal level, is ultimately contingent upon a potentially 
problematic dichotomy between expressive versus inventive or 
utilitarian innovation. 
This Part describes an intractable conflict drawn from within 
intellectual property doctrine—namely, the conflict surrounding 
the Useful Article Doctrine’s “separability” standard—and argues 
that doctrinal conflict suffers from a lack of principled balancing 
of forward-going incentives with protection of the creative 
commons.  At a first cut, if ex ante, the value of the innovation is 
greater than the loss to the creative commons, the law might 
construct monopolistic protection.  But this Part shows that this 
form of external analysis points to a deeper theoretical tension 
internal to, and at the very heart of, intellectual property 
doctrine. 
Where one conceives of intellectual property externally, in 
maximizing terms, the very distinction between copyright and 
patent, however central to intellectual doctrine, dissolves.  As one 
abstracts away from intractably conflicting positive doctrine in 
the direction of external principles, one becomes less certain that 
initial statutory categories are well formed; that is, one begins to 
lose theoretical confidence in the very doctrinal categories that 
engender the initial conflict.  True, if monopolistic protection is to 
exist at all, maximizing principles might ultimately construct 
higher and lower gradations of protection attendant to dif-
ferential areas of innovation.  But, crucially, this Part shows that 
these categories would not pattern the expression/utilitarian-
function distinction in any one-to-one fashion.  The recognition of 
this internal breakdown in turn leads to the theoretical question 
of whether or not monopolistic protection is compatible with 
maximizing principles, whether aimed at the position of the least 
well-off or net-aggregate welfare.  It also raises further questions 
into the general structure of intellectual property ownership and 
innovation policy beyond the traditional bounds of intellectual 
property doctrine. 
24 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1   
B. The Useful Article Doctrine 
Consider the internal workings of traditional intellectual 
property law in the context of the Useful Article Doctrine and its 
“separability” standard, which is invoked when an expressive work 
bears an inventive or utilitarian function.86  The Doctrine oper-
ates squarely at the intersection of copyright and patent and 
allows for copyright’s monopolistic protection of useful or inven-
tive articles “if, and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”87  The statute 
aims to define the contours of intellectual property protection for 
articles bearing both a utilitarian-inventive function, the typical 
domain of patent, and an expressive component, the domain of 
copyright.  Interestingly, if an article’s expressive aspect is 
“separable” from its utilitarian function, it need not be precluded 
from invoking copyright’s lower bar to monopolistic protection.  
The doctrine allows an overlap of copyright with the typical 
domain of patent, but at the same time produces a gap between 
the two, thereby precluding the use of copyright’s lower bar to 
monopolistic protection as a strategic end run around patent’s 
elevated barriers to monopolistic protection. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the legal construction of “separa-
bility” has caused significant doctrinal conflict, and there is no 
consensus over how courts are to construct the concept.  Impor-
tant leading judges, circuit courts, and prominent legal scholars 
are significantly split over the correct analysis of “separability” 
 
86 “A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is 
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An 
article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a ‘useful article.’ ” 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
87 Section 101 states:  
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional and 
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, 
prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and 
technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include 
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechan-
ical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as 
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and 
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article. 
Id. 
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for copyright purposes.88  Notoriously, intractably conflicting case 
law invokes differential and inconsistent standards in attributing 
or denying ownership and control via copyright protection to such 
“useful articles” bearing original expressive authorship.  The basic 
issue is this: on one hand, a narrow doctrinal construction of 
“separability” reduces the domain of copyrightable useful arti-
cles—for example, leaving fashion design unprotected—thereby 
increasing the magnitude of the gap between copyright and 
patent with its higher bar to monopolistic protection. 
Therefore, the narrower the construction of “separability,” 
the wider the gap between copyright and patent, and the broader 
the range of useful articles potentially beyond the reach of 
intellectual property protection.  On the other hand, a more ex-
pansive legal construction of “separability” increases the breadth 
of copyrightable subject matter but risks encroaching patent’s 
domain and its attendant elevated bar to intellectual property 
protection.  Ultimately, then, there is a trade-off.  On one side, 
there is a narrow construction of “separability” and the attendant 
increased risk of reduced investment and market failure in 
unprotected useful articles bearing an expressive component.  On 
the other side, there is a broader construction of “separability” 
and an increased risk of “too much” monopolistic protection for 
utilitarian articles—interestingly with copyright’s expanded term 
of years—owing to copyright’s encroachment upon patent’s 
domain and its heightened bar to monopolistic protection. 
Questions concerning property ownership are, by their 
nature, controversial and quickly lend themselves to significant 
disagreement.  The creation of new property rights or the per-
ceived destruction of existing property rights is no exception, and 
further, where value will be protected by a monopolistic rule, one 
expects conflict.  It is unsurprising that competing tests over sep-
arability have emerged, functionally effecting competing commit-
ments concerning ownership and the breadth of monopolistic 
protection. 
Consider the various conflicting legal tests and accounts of 
“separability” that have emerged in the courts.  First, there is a 
narrow test requiring physical separability of the article’s aes-
thetic and functional aspects arising from a Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit case in which the court deferred 
 
88 See infra notes 89–96 and accompanying text (detailing six approaches to a 
“separability” analysis).  
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to a regulation limiting copyright to situations in which “features 
of a utilitarian article . . . ‘can be identified separately and are 
capable of existing independently as a work of art.’ ”89 
Second, there is a “conceptual separability” test, sometimes 
referred to as the Denicola test.  Here, if utilitarian concerns 
dominated in the design process, the object would not be copy-
rightable, but if elements of the design represent “artistic 
judgment exercised independently of functional influences,” then 
the object could be copyrightable.90  In Brandir, the Second 
Circuit denied copyright to an innovative bicycle rack design 
because “the form of the rack [was] influenced in significant 
measure by utilitarian concerns and thus any aesthetic elements 
[could not] be said to be conceptually separable from the 
utilitarian elements.”91  In a dissent, Judge Winter argued for a 
different version of the “conceptual separability” test, under 
which an object is a candidate for copyright if “the design of a 
useful article, however intertwined with the article’s utilitarian 
aspects, causes an ordinary reasonable observer to perceive an 
aesthetic concept not related to the article’s use.”92 
Still another version of “conceptual separability” has been 
proposed by Goldstein, under which a “pictorial, graphic or 
sculptural feature incorporated in the design of a useful article is 
conceptually separable if it can stand on its own as a work of art 
traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is 
embodied would be equally useful without it.”93  Judge Newman 
offered a fourth version of the “conceptual separability” test un-
der which separability regarding a feature exists if “the design 
creates in the mind of the ordinary[, reasonable] observer two differ-
ent concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously.”94 
A fifth approach asks which of the utilitarian and expressive 
functions is primary and which is subsidiary.  In Kieselstein-Cord 
v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., the Second Circuit held the “primary 
ornamental aspect” of handcrafted belt-buckles “conceptually sep-
arable from their subsidiary utilitarian function,” noting that the 
 
89 Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
90 Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 
1987). See generally Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A 
Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983). 
91 Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147. 
92 Id. at 1151 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
93 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.5.3.1(b) (3d ed. Supp. 2019-2). 
94 Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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buckles were widely known as works of art and that several had 
been donated to the permanent collection at the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art.95  Finally, Alfred Yen has even suggested an 
aesthetic conception of separability drawing upon philosophical 
accounts of the conceptual inclusion conditions for counting as 
art in determining whether or not aesthetic aspects of an article 
are separable from the functional aspects.96  
The construction of “separability,” internal to copyright 
doctrine, has become so contested that in 2016 the Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari on the matter with 
the aim of sweeping away existing confusion.  Given the magni-
tude of not only the legal disagreement but also the economic 
consequences for industry, this is perhaps unsurprising.  In Star 
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,97 the Court addressed 
the copyright eligibility of the artistic elements of the designs of 
useful articles.  At issue were the validity of “copyright registra-
tions for two-dimensional designs” of cheerleading uniforms, 
consisting of “chevrons . . . , lines, curves, stripes . . . , and shapes.”98  
According to the Copyright Act, “the design of a useful arti-
cle . . . shall be considered a [copyrightable] work only if . . . such 
design incorporates [copyrightable] features that can be identi-
fied separately from, and are capable of existing independently 
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”99  Notably, the opinion of 
the Court, written by Justice Thomas, and a dissent, written by 
Justice Breyer, each took a different approach to the separability 
analysis in this case. 
Justice Thomas articulated a two-part test for separability: 
[A] feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is 
eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be 
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate 
from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed 
in some other tangible medium of expression—if it were 
imagined separately from the useful article into which it is 
incorporated.100  
 
95 632 F.2d 989, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1980). 
96 See generally Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998). 
97 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
98 Id. at 1007 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
99 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
100 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. 
28 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1   
The first step of his analysis was to determine that the test for 
separability “depend[ed] solely on statutory interpretation” of the 
language of the United States Code section 101.101  The opinion 
then identified two requirements for separability from the text of 
section 101.  First, the element must be able to “be identified sep-
arately from . . . the utilitarian aspects of the article.”102  Second, 
the element must be “capable of existing independently of[ ] the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.”103 
An element can be identified separately from a useful article 
if a person can “look at the useful article and spot some two- or 
three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural qualities.”104  And an element is capable of 
existing independently if it can “exist as its own pictorial, graph-
ic, or sculptural work . . . once it is imagined apart from the 
useful article.”105 
“In sum, a feature of the design of a useful article is eligible 
for copyright if, when identified and imagined apart from the 
useful article, it would qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural work either on its own or when fixed in some other tangible 
medium.”106  Because Varsity’s designs satisfied both elements, 
the Court found them to be separable and copyrightable.107  
Notably, the Court rejected the narrow “physical . . . separability” 
test and the Denicola-inspired version of “conceptual sepa-
rability,”108 citing Judge Winter’s dissent in Brandir favorably.109 
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the cheerleader 
uniforms failed the separability test.  Although he “agree[d] with 
much in the Court’s opinion,” he did not agree that the designs 
could “be perceived as . . . two- or three-dimensional work[s] of 
art separate from the useful article.”110  Under Justice Breyer’s 
approach, the separability analysis contains “two exercises, one 
physical, one mental.”111  First, he asks, “Can the design fea-
 
101 Id. at 1010 (citation omitted). 
102 Id. (citation omitted). 
103 Id. (citation omitted). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1012. 
107 Id. at 1016. 
108 Id. at 1014–15 (citation omitted) (“The statute’s text makes clear, however, 
that our inquiry is limited to how the article and feature are perceived, not how or 
why they were designed.”). 
109 Id. at 1015. 
110 Id. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alterations in original). 
111 Id. at 1031. 
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tures . . . be physically removed from the article (and considered 
separately), all while leaving the fully functioning utilitarian 
object in place?”112  If not, a person must be able to “conceive of 
the design features separately without replicating a picture of 
the utilitarian object.”113 
To determine whether a design element satisfies the “capable 
of existing independently” requirement, Justice Breyer proposed 
“imagin[ing] the feature on its own and ask[ing], ‘Have I created 
a picture of a (useful part of a) useful article?’ If so, the design is 
not separable from the useful article.  If not, it is.”114  And because 
Varsity’s designs “look[ed] like cheerleader uniforms,” or “like 
pictures of cheerleading uniforms,” “there [was] nothing to 
separate out but for dress-shaped lines that replicate[d] the cut 
and style of the uniforms.”115  On that basis, he would have held 
that the designs were not separable and the uniforms not 
copyrightable.116 
Although the Court had aimed to dispense with confusion, it 
is not clear that the new test articulated in the opinion remedies 
the matter.  The Court’s test resolves certain quandaries while, 
at the same time, raising new ones.  The problem with the doc-
trine does not merely emanate from past inconsistency; the issue 
that plagues the analysis runs deeper.  The Useful Article Doctrine 
starts with two broad categories in intellectual property: the 
dichotomy between articles potentially associated with statuto-
rily defined copyrightable subject matter, and those potentially 
associated with statutorily defined patentable subject matter.  
The Useful Article Doctrine adopts these two existing categories 
and their respective doctrinal labels: expressive versus inventive 
or utilitarian.  The trouble flows, in part, from the fact that the 
statutorily defined categories are not well characterized by these 
labels.  Consider, for example, the statutory mandate that computer 
programs are deemed copyrightable subject matter.117  The issue 
with the expressive-inventive dichotomy comes to this: (1) so-called 
“expressive” works bear a general utilitarian—or welfarist—




114 Id. at 1033. 
115 Id. at 1035. 
116 Id. at 1035–36. 
117 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
30 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1   
So, where useful articles are both “expressive” and “inven-
tive,” one faces a dilemma between two types of error.118  The first 
type of error is false copyright positives, resulting in copyright 
protection—replete with its lower barrier and longer term of 
years—being applied to patentable subject matter.119  The second 
type of error is the possibility of false copyright negatives, 
resulting in too little copyright protection available to innovation 
that is suitable to copyright’s lower bar and longer term of 
years.120  What is needed is not a linguistic analysis of the term 
“separability” but an account of intellectual property protection 
that recognizes the trade-offs between false positives and false 
negatives and provides a balance between the two.  Notably, 
differing principled accounts of ownership will yield differing 
results in terms of balancing these two types of errors. 
The courts, however, have seemingly found themselves 
caught up in an internal analysis of the linguistic meaning of 
“separability,” as opposed to providing a solution to this balanc-
ing problem.  Some of the tests of separability appear intuitively 
appealing, while others can be viewed as largely results-driven.  
But the Court’s recent test has the potential to reach absurd 
outcomes, which could inadvertently create “mutant” forms of 
intellectual property by characterizing articles that might best be 
understood as patentable subject matter as copyrightable.  This 
characterization could allow such items to enjoy copyright’s low 
barrier to entry and extended monopolistic protection.  What is 
 
118 See Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 4, at 1349 (discussing Mayo Collabora-
tive Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad Genetics, Inc.), 689 F.3d 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), in light of the trade-offs surrounding the patentability of the 
building blocks of science and cost to the creative commons, given the possibility of 
too much or too little monopolistic protection from the perspective of differing 
distributive principles); Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1358 (discussing the 
types of errors that decision makers might make in the determination of pat-
entability qua functionality and noting that “[i]n determining the value of different 
screening regimes, the law should consider both the relative costs of each of these 
kinds of errors and their relative probabilities”); Collins, supra note 7, at 1612; 
Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 176–77 & n.5 
(discussing generally the cost of errors surrounding the broadening of intellectual 
property rights; specifically noting Mayo in the context of the patentability of laws of 
nature or the building blocks of science; and maintaining that courts cannot “simply 
ignore any IP-right-broadening error as harmless; they know that this excessive 
propertization can harm innovation just as readily as its opposite”). 
119 See e.g., LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 87. 
120 See id. at 91–92 (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 
(1st Cir. 1995), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (per curiam). 
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actually fueling the trouble is cycling between broader versus 
narrower linguistic analyses of “separability,” with notably 
insufficient attention to the consequential balance at stake and 
the ways in which differing principled conceptions of ownership 
might resolve the matter. 
The divergent “separability” tests are too focused on “plain 
language” and defining the essentially contested concept of 
“separability” in linguistic terms internal to legal doctrine.  
Instead, if one is to follow maximizing principles, the focus should 
be on a consequentialist, or balancing, resolution to the problem at 
hand.  No matter how much care and skill in rule-craft is brought 
to bear, given the initial false dichotomy, too much copyright 
protection will always need to be balanced against too little.  
Again, the need for this balance is an inevitable result of the two 
ill-defined terms, or the false dichotomy that frames the very 
discussion in the first instance.  The various tests are too focused 
on the contested concept of “separability” and insufficiently 
focused on the substantive reasons for the categories in the first 
instance. 
C. The Useful Article Doctrine and External Principles 
Considering the conflict in terms of internal versus external 
accounts of law is helpful.  On one hand, the internal, doctrinal, 
or first-order conflict can be viewed as intractable, given the 
essentially contested121 nature of the term “separability.”  But if 
one moves up a level of abstraction from the immediate legal 
doctrine, such first-order doctrinal conflict can be viewed ex-
ternally, at the level of principle.  From a more abstract vantage 
point, the doctrinal conflict emanates from a failure to clarify 
conflicting second-order, principled accounts of ownership.  So, 
first-order doctrinal conflict surrounding ownership can, at times, 
be understood as a failure in second-order or principled analysis.  
Such failure, in turn, can camouflage the essentially contested 
aspects of the first-order legal doctrine, thereby causing the form 
of perpetual doctrinal deadlock we see surrounding separability. 
Now consider again the broader copyright and patent divide 
in light of external principles, whether maximizing net-aggregate 
 
121 W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 
167, 167– 70 (1956) (discussing essentially contested concepts as concepts that admit 
of convergence or agreement over their general meaning but lack convergence over 
the best conception of the concept in question or the correct practical application of 
that concept, for example, the concept of “fairness”). 
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welfare or the Rawlsian difference principle maximizing the 
position of the least well-off.  From such a maximizing perspec-
tive, the statutory divide in intellectual property doctrine is not 
merely definitional.  True, monopolistic protection might break 
down into lower-threshold and higher-threshold categories, 
perhaps akin to the copyright and patent divide, but any such 
divide would be merely for consequentialist reasons.  At a broad 
level, all valuable innovation or creation, by definition, improves 
human welfare and bears a utility function, if in different ways. 
From an externalist maximizing perspective, however, any 
divide in monopolistic protection concerns the evaluation of what 
is sometimes called “collective creativity,”122 that is, an ex ante 
balance of the ex post cost of monopolistic protection in terms of 
the removal from the “commons” and the creation of incentives to 
innovation.  The thinking here might be that monopolistic protec-
tion of works associated with copyrightable subject matter tends, 
on average, to be less deleterious to collective creativity than the 
monopolistic protection of innovation associated with patentable 
subject matter.  Further, once copyright imposes a bar on the 
monopoly protection of “ideas” and allows such protection only for 
expressions of such ideas, the creative commons is fairly well 
insulated from loss.123  True, the expression of the idea is re-
moved from the commons, but the idea itself remains and stands 
ready for further use in collective creativity.  Further, the 
idea/expression distinction operates against the backdrop of 
exceptions to copyright protection, for example, the merger124 and 
fair use doctrines125 and the remedial aspects of copyright law 
 
122 See generally Menell & Yablon, supra note 7 (discussing the creative commons). 
123 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1879) (discussing the distinction 
between uncopyrightable ideas and copyrightable expressions). See also 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2018) (“(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship,” and “(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
124 See LEAFFER, supra note 85, at 92–93 (“Under the merger doctrine, courts 
will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the idea underlying the 
work can be expressed only in one or a few different ways, for fear that there may be 
a monopoly on the underlying idea. In such an instance, it is said that the work’s 
idea and expression ‘merge.’ ”). 
125 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by [sections 106 
and 106A], for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (in-
cluding multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.”). 
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that do not automatically or mechanically apply injunctions to 
infringement.126  Together, this yields the result that monopo-
listic copyright protection may, on average, likely be less costly to 
the collective commons than monopolistic protection offered to 
the innovation associated with patentable subject matter. 
Given the preceding rationale, the law might provide a 
substantially lower bar to obtaining some form of monopolistic 
protection in some domains, and a higher bar in others.127  The 
law may also grant such protection for a longer term of years.  
But crucially, any distinction would not be due to a primary 
divide between expressive and inventive or utilitarian aspects of 
innovation; those terms become secondary or derivative of the 
primary utility or welfare calculus.  Return to the Useful Article 
Doctrine, which picks up this distinction between these two 
domains of innovation but does so from the statutory perspective, 
as opposed to an externalist or principled one.  If one is to avoid 
falling back into the game of words surrounding the legal concept 
of “separability,”128 one must recognize that, from the externalist 
perspective, these two categories would only be constructed for 
consequentialist reasons.  These reasons are not primarily associ-
ated with the dichotomy between “expressive” versus “inventive 
or utilitarian” innovations but rather the ex ante welfarist effect 
on innovation and the ex post effect upon the creative commons.  
Put this way, as noted above, the two categories are not mutually 
exclusive—indeed, the first is a species of the second. 
Given the cycling of conflict in the context of separability, 
one is understandably tempted to return to the doctrinal catego-
ries or statutory groupings that frame intellectual property 
 
126 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–91 (2006) (award-
ing damages, as opposed to injunctive relief, in the context of infringement and 
requiring the satisfaction of a four-prong balancing test in awarding injunctions). 
127 McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 7, at 540 (insightfully discussing the 
possible justification of monopolistic protection from the perspective of high produc-
tion costs, as opposed to cost to the creative commons).  
If we are going to have an IP system with different types of rights, then 
surely there must be reasons why certain rules apply to particular subject 
matter. 
Some might suggest that different forms of rights are needed because 
some subject matter is costlier to produce and more difficult to exclude 
others from. 
Id. McKenna and Sprigman further comment skeptically on the positive law’s 
sorting rules surrounding copyright, patent and trademark: “But even though that 
observation is undeniably true, it has virtually no explanatory power regarding 
existing doctrinal rules.” Id. 
128 See supra Section II.B. 
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doctrine debate to get one’s bearings.129  But such a return to 
doctrine will only go so far; from the externalist perspective, the 
very bounds of such categories and doctrines are themselves 
constructed, in the first instance, by antecedent principled ac-
counts of ownership in intellectual property.  Such principles do 
not begin with statutorily imposed categories; their reach is 
deeper; they define the very construction of such categories.  
True, any delineation in intellectual property between patent and 
copyright, as an example, must ultimately be set by statute, but 
any such divide is derivative of distributive principles.  Such 
principles, where invoked, whether aimed at net-aggregate 
wealth or the position of the least well-off, would define the very 
bounds and details of the statutory construction.130  The collapse 
of the doctrinal distinction between patent and copyright, as 
constructed in the current positive law, is an open possibility.131   
Insights surrounding the balancing required for a conse-
quentialist resolution to the “separability” conundrum can be 
pushed even further still.  From such a consequentialist perspec-
tive, the question goes directly to the justification of monopolistic 
protection in the first instance.  Correspondingly, scholars disagree 
about the extent to which monopolistic protection is necessary 
from the perspective of incentive to innovation.  There is the real 
possibility that monopolistic rules—whether conceived of as 
copyright, patent, or otherwise—are non-optimal in the face of 
maximizing principles. 
D. Copyright Skepticism 
Justice Stephen Breyer has famously introduced a level of 
skepticism with regard to copyright’s monopolistic protection.132  
His insight is that the “natural” lead time between publication 
and potential copying can itself, in many cases, serve as sufficient 
 
129 Menell & Yablon, supra note 7, at 147 (discussing the confusion surrounding 
Star Athletica, and concluding that courts should “look to statutory requirements 
and limitations, legislative guidance, and the foundational principles undergirding 
the intellectual property system”). 
130 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 600 
(1988) (discussing fixed rules and their relationship to the commons). 
131 Kapczynski, supra note 5, at 977, 982–83 (discussing the economic efficiency 
accounts of Demsetz and Hayek, presumably wealth maximization, and maintaining 
“that IP internalism cannot, as a general matter, be justified by appeals to efficiency”). 
132 Breyer, supra note 42, at 299 (“A book’s initial publisher will ordinarily enjoy 
several advantages that may partially offset a copier’s lower production costs. . . . 
[H]is book will reach the market first.”). 
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incentive to innovation, absent monopolistic rules.133  Similarly, 
in a vein skeptical of the universal necessity of copyright, 
Raustiala and Sprigman have called into question the need for 
copyright in the context of fashion design.134  Maintaining—how-
ever counterintuitively—that copyright is not only unnecessary 
but also that its absence serves as sufficient incentive to 
innovation, Raustiala and Sprigman argue that, in the context of 
fashion design, piracy serves to spur innovation; consumer 
demand for new fashion designs each season is actually spurred 
by the threat of the introduction of knock-offs in the market.135  
Further, they argue that price discrimination can insulate the 
market for originals from the market for mere copies while at the 
same time providing a unique form of advertising for originals.136 
Whether these arguments yield the conclusion that monopo-
listic rules are unnecessary is an empirical as well as a structural 
question.  The empirical matter concerns, in some measure, the 
state of technology and is akin to something of an information 
cost question.137  The second part of the issue concerns the 
structure of the legal rules against which any comparison is to be 
evaluated and how copyright’s monopolistic protection—or its 
absence—would dynamically interact with that set of rules.  The 
empirical question concerns the speed of production of in-
distinguishable high-quality copies.  Technological advance could 
significantly alter the lead-time calculus by lowering the cost of 
design information, as well as production speed.  Near instanta-
neous production of high-quality copies could, for example, 
eliminate lead time entirely.  Consider the possibility of the 
instantaneous transmission of digital images from high-fashion 
runways to production facilities in China.138  Such a reduction in 
lead time would, perhaps, militate in the direction of increased 
monopolistic protection or incentive to creation.  The second part 
of the question surrounds the structure of other operative—
nonmonopolistic—legal rules governing ownership that too serve 
as disincentives to innovation.  Such rules, while perhaps viewed 
as mere background rules from the internal perspective of 
 
133 Id. 
134 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 44, at 1698, 1718. 
135 Id. at 1722–24. 
136 Id. 
137 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) 
(“From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant 
changes in technology.”). 
138 2 MENELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 742.  
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traditional copyright doctrine, operate simultaneously and dy-
namically interact with any monopolistic copyright rules. 
Return to the copyright-skepticism that Breyer139 and 
Raustiala and Sprigman140 have introduced.  Industries like 
publishing, unlike fashion design, have subject matter that 
allows for monopolistic protection, but, as Justice Breyer points 
out, there is the possibility that copyright law admits of arguably 
unnecessary and costly monopolistic protection.141  The claim, if 
true, would in turn yield the conclusion that the present state of 
copyright unnecessarily increases transaction costs and dead-
weight loss through, for example, what Heller and Eisenberg 
have famously described as a “tragedy of the anticommons.”142  
Further, the current state of affairs may increase the risk of un-
justified, costly legal conflict and may be deleterious to collective 
creativity.  Consistent with Justice Breyer’s skepticism toward 
the inefficiencies surrounding the current state of monopolistic 
copyright protection, where such protection is available, Raustiala 
and Sprigman brilliantly explain how an entire innovative 
industry, however counterintuitively, might flourish largely 
without monopolistic copyright protection.143  This body of skepti-
cal work shows that there can be innovation without monopolistic 
protection and, at the same time, provides—even if implicitly—a 
needed cautionary note against falling into the trap of thinking 
that, where innovative value exists, we ought to automatically 
construct corresponding monopolistic legal rights.  Monopolistic 
rights come at a cost; where one is a consequentialist, the oppo-
site may often be true. 
Still, from the externalist perspective of maximizing princi-
ples, Breyer’s and Raustiala and Sprigman’s respective insights 
invite further questions over whether or not the current 
equilibrium is maximally efficient, and if not, what the optimal 
level of monopolistic protection might be.  From Justice Breyer’s 
perspective, there is the possibility of too much monopolistic 
protection in publishing,144 and Raustiala and Sprigman note 
that the fashion industry is profitable without monopolistic 
 
139 Breyer, supra note 42, at 299. 
140 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 44, at 1698, 1718. 
141 Breyer, supra note 42, at 299. 
142 See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
143 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 44, at 1698, 1718. 
144 Breyer, supra note 42, at 299. 
2020] MAXIMIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 37 
protection.145  These important insights raise questions concern-
ing the optimal level of monopolistic protection and how, as a 
matter of institutional design, optimality might be obtained.  The 
fact that some areas may admit of too much protection is 
insufficient to show that zero is optimal; at the same time, the 
fact that the fashion industry is profitable nearly without 
monopolistic protection does not yield the conclusion that near 
zero is optimal.  The fashion industry, for example, might carry 
on reasonably well, although hampered or “taxed” by an un-
justifiable lack of monopolistic protection, even from the perspec-
tive of concern for collective creativity.  Recognizing Breyer’s146 
and Raustiala and Sprigman’s147 important cautionary observ-
ations that monopolistic rules may not always be necessary to 
incentivize creation, one begins to think of innovation policy in 
terms of incentives to innovation from the broader perspective of 
institutional design. 
III.  THE CONSEQUENTIALIST INNOVATION PUZZLE 
Now, with the question of optimal monopolistic protection at 
the fore, consider innovation policy more broadly.  From the 
forward-looking perspective, a significant analytic puzzle arises 
over the structure of innovation policy.  Here, the aims of intel-
lectual property and innovation policy are stated ex ante, but 
there is still room for significant divergence over institutional 
design and the form that legal rule constructions should take.  
That is, even where the instrumentalist goals or maximizing 
aims are well articulated, it is less clear how institutions and 
legal rules ought to be constructed in meeting those goals.  The 
possibilities are complex, and it is important to understand what 
is traded off and balanced in a forward-looking approach to 
monopolistic protection. 
Start with some initial considerations.  Monopolistic intellec-
tual property rules might be justified if their addition to a given 
set of legal rules would predictably create greater welfare gains 
than the set of legal rules would create absent such monopolistic 
protection.  This would, of course, occur if such rules served as an 
incentive to creation and innovation.  Importantly, however, the 
baseline in innovation—absent monopolistic rules—is not zero.  A 
 
145 Raustiala & Sprigman, note 44, at 1698, 1718. 
146 Breyer, supra note 42, at 299. 
147 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 44, at 1698, 1718. 
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measure of innovation can arise against the backdrop of a set of 
legal rules absent monopolistic protection or any focused in-
novation policy through ambient human ingenuity, desire for 
glory, passion, or inventive “tinkering.”  To be clear, the measure 
of innovation and creation that may occur against the backdrop 
of legal and institutional legal rules, absent enhanced legal or 
institutional incentives, is not zero.  Any innovation incentivized 
by monopolistic rules would have to outweigh the deadweight 
loss associated with “naturally” motivated “tinkerers” who would 
opt for monopolistic protection, were monopolistic rules to exist.  
Some such “tinkerers” would invoke intellectual property protec-
tion, once it is available. 
But this, importantly, is not the end of the story.  The 
forward-looking analysis is more complicated; there is a further 
dimension to consider beyond just the loss of potential “natural” 
innovation.  If one is to maximize, one must take account of the 
magnitude of hypothetical forward-going deadweight loss, bal-
anced against the gains of hypothetical innovation, were monopo-
listic rules to exist.  Importantly, the measure here is not merely 
an ex ante calculation that monopolistic rules can be predicted to 
serve as further incentives to innovation, against the baseline of 
a set of rules in which such monopolistic rules do not exist and 
innovation and creation comes only through “tinkering.”  Here, if 
one is to follow maximizing principles, hypothetical gains in 
innovation achieved through monopolistic incentives must be 
balanced against hypothetical losses associated with monopolistic 
rules—albeit losses that would not have existed—had the in-
novation in question not been developed via monopolistic rules.  
Once such hypothetical gains, subject to hypothetical deadweight 
loss, become the new baseline, meeting the forward-going 
justificatory burden becomes increasingly difficult. 
Considering the ex ante balance of hypothetical gains minus 
hypothetical losses invites inquiry into the structural efficiency 
and the distribution of benefits and burdens of monopolistic legal 
protection.  If monopolistic rules are difficult to justify in welfare 
terms once hypothetical gains and losses are taken into account, 
then as a matter of institutional design, forward-looking theorists 
compare the scheme of monopolistic rules to alternative, less 
costly, incentive-based schemes of legal rules.148  For example, a 
system of prizes, funded through tax revenue, could provide 
 
148 See, e.g., INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 6, at 136–38. 
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incentives to innovation.  But, prizes also come at a cost, and, im-
portantly, not just a cost in the value of the prize itself but also in 
the deadweight loss associated with increased taxation required 
to fund the prize.  Further, a scheme of legal rules including 
taxes and prizes, like monopolistic protection, also bears the 
attendant deadweight loss associated with redirecting ambient 
tinkering into the taxation and prize system. 
So, the comparison is between (A) the value of the hypothet-
ical innovation incentivized by monopolistic entitlement rules, 
minus the combined values of (i) the loss of natural tinkering, 
(ii) the predicted hypothetical deadweight loss associated with 
monopolistic rules, and (iii) administration costs, and (B) the 
positive value of predicted innovation incentivized by prizes 
minus (i) again, the value of lost natural tinkering, plus (ii) the 
predicted deadweight loss caused by the added negative distor-
tion of the labor-leisure trade-off associated with the marginally 
higher tax-rates needed to fund prizes, plus (iii) the cost of the 
prizes themselves and administration costs.  The more one is 
skeptical of the likelihood that A is greater than B, the more one 
tends to favor taxation and prizes over monopolistic intellectual 
property rules as the ideal scheme to serve as incentive to 
innovation.  It follows from this that, from a maximizing perspec-
tive where the concern is over optimal innovation policy, one 
must be prepared to consider abandoning monopolistic legal rules 
in favor of a different set of legal rules and alternative-account 
institutional design, however it may be conceived. 
 
IV.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION 
POLICY AND MAXIMIZING PRINCIPLES 
A. Budget Expenditures, “Background” Rules, and Non-
Traditional Intellectual Property Doctrine 
The preceding Part directs one’s attention to questions of 
institutional design.  As noted, prior to the selection of any specif-
ic innovation policy scheme, any existing set of legal rules 
contain their own unique innovation disincentives, whether via 
private law rules constructed by insolvency law or via the 
taxation system; the “given” baseline in incentive to innovation 
is, as stated above, importantly non-zero.  From a maximizing 
perspective, however, the matter is more complicated still.  
Consider, for example, the multiple functions of budget expendi-
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tures, e.g., the Federal Medicaid and Medicare programs and the 
Federal Prescription Drug Plan D.  As Douglas Kahn and Jeffrey 
Lehman have argued, these forms of government spending, in 
the first instance, constitute public provisions and, as such, 
create basic entitlement baselines.149  But such expenditures, 
whether intentionally or not, also serve a second function, 
however inefficiently; these expenditures alter incentives and 
serve as a subsidy to innovation in healthcare and pharmaceuti-
cal research and development.  Similarly, charitable tax deductions 
for philanthropic gifts are, in effect, a subsidy to innovation 
associated with hospitals and universities, for example.  In terms 
of the tax base, the designation and differential tax treatment of 
long-term capital gains income versus ordinary income—
especially in the context of the taxation of private equity funds—
alters incentives and subsidizes innovation in the finance 
industry.  Beyond taxation and tax policy, any scheme of “back-
ground” rules also contains rules enabling and limiting the 
freedom to contract, tort law, corporate law, laws governing 
trusts and estates, regulations embodying the entitlement-
granting rules of the administrative state, and insolvency law 
and policy.  In conjunction with one another, these groups of legal 
rules construct a specific, non-zero measure of incentive to 
innovation, even where such rules, perhaps deceptively, appear 
merely to operate in the “background” to innovation policy. 
Importantly, it is this set of legal rules that serves as the 
baseline against which one measures innovation policy.  All legal 
rules taken together, inclusive of taxation policy, for example, 
construct ownership baselines of necessity; in comparing compet-
ing innovation policies, one must hold constant the scheme of 
“background” legal rules that control ownership, in which 
competing innovation policy schemes might operate.  But, the 
notion of “background” is merely a heuristic device that can be 
extremely deceptive.  It is within this backdrop of legal rules—
replete with its own respective innovation baseline—that the 
selected innovation policy will find its home, ultimately in the 
construction of a complete scheme of legal rules.  The innovation 
policy ultimately selected will find a home within the complete 
scheme of legal rules, not outside of it; the so-called “background” 
rules will straightforwardly interact with the selected innovation 
 
149 See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A 
Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1662–63 (1992). 
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policy.  Once selected, the innovation policy becomes unified into 
the complete scheme of legal rules; such rules, of necessity, 
interact with one another, introducing the possibility of further 
inefficiency gains or losses.  Where one is to follow maximizing 
principles, alignment is absolutely critical. 
Once rules governing innovation policy are added, incentives 
and subsidies are altered; all aspects of the now complete scheme 
of entitlement-oriented legal rules operate in tandem with one 
another.  The deceptive nature of the term “background” rules 
now becomes plain.  Once innovation policy is added, many aspects 
of the existing set of rules against which innovation policy was 
chosen become the innovation policy itself.  Ultimately, the inno-
vation policy cannot be disaggregated from the “background 
rules,” and alignment among all rules is critical.  For example, an 
innovation policy aimed at maximizing wealth would be signifi-
cantly hampered by an insolvency policy self-consciously aimed 
at firm and job preservation and a tax base that does not, for 
example, prefer capital gains over ordinary income. 
Maximizing principles, by their nature and over the range of 
their domain, do not admit of much latitude in rule construction.  
From the perspective of institutional design, the issue becomes 
the comparison of competing complete sets of legal rules 
governing ownership and the question of how such competing 
schemes serve the external maximizing principle.  But, thinking 
from this perspective brings one to contemplate institutional 
design beyond the mere confines of the copyright/patent divide or 
legal doctrine internal to traditional intellectual property.  Where 
the aim is the maximization of wealth or the position of the least 
well-off, the inquiry directs itself to structural questions con-
cerning the complete set of ownership rules and the role 
innovation policy might play with or without monopolistic protec-
tion, whether described as copyright, patent, or however else.  
Once one recognizes the important role of “background” rules, it 
becomes plain that the proper analysis must reach well beyond 
intellectual property’s traditional bounds.  In this vein, consider 
bankruptcy law’s treatment of intellectual property in the 
context of executory contracts.150  Bankruptcy rules lie outside 
 
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) 
of this section, notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired 
lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the 
assignment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease 
under paragraph (2) of this subsection.”); Perlman v. Catapult Ent., Inc. (In re 
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the scope of canonical or traditional intellectual property doc-
trine.  As such, they are subject either to being deceptively taken 
as given or assumed to operate in the background or at the 
periphery of private law or intellectual property.  But selection 
among competing conceptions of bankruptcy policy, like taxation, 
ex ante, creates incentives for innovation, for example, by 
comparatively altering risk and its distributive impact upon the 
poor.  Ex post bankruptcy policy stands behind property owner-
ship by governing asset allocation in the context of insolvency.  
Thus, there is an interactive relationship among all entitlement-
governing legal rules from a maximizing perspective.  
B. Bankruptcy and Monopolistic Licenses 
Now consider a second example, not drawn from inside 
traditional intellectual property law but instead drawn from 
what one might only erroneously, from an externalist max-
imizing perspective, conceive of as a set of background rules.  In 
bankruptcy, there is significant doctrinal conflict surrounding a 
debtor-in-possession’s rights to assume executory contracts in-
volving patent licenses in cases where assumption is crucial to a 
successful restructuring but contrary to the will of patent 
licensors.151  Here, intellectual property ownership and control is 
at stake.  The trade-off is between (1) bankruptcy’s construction of 
the strength of patent ownership, and (2) the risk of firm failure.  
The question is whether bankruptcy law should construct an in-
effect mandatory reassignable regime with respect to patent 
licenses that is indifferent to the will of the licensor or instead 
construct patents as “personal and nondelegable.”152  An (in-
effect) mandatory reassignability regime, as opposed to a per-
sonal and nondelegable regime, would disallow patent licensors 
to block the assumption of executory contracts containing patent 
licenses, allowing for mandatory reallocation of patent licenses 
conducive to firm restructuring.  Such a mandatory reassignment 
regime may reduce the risk of firm failure and its attendant 
social costs but, at the same time, would lower patents’ value and 
thereby decrease ex ante investment in patents. 
 
Catapult Ent., Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999); Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge 
Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 490 (1st Cir. 1997); Menell, supra note 8, at 789. 
151 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1).  
152 Compare In re Catapult Ent., Inc., 165 F.3d at 750, with Institut Pasteur, 104 
F.3d at 490. 
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Yet, despite its potential for profound effect on intellectual 
property and innovation, bankruptcy law, if conventionally 
understood, would operate in the background to intellectual 
property, not as constitutive of it.  But, bankruptcy, like taxation, 
potentially constrains, alters, and redefines intellectual property 
ownership and control.153  In the conventional view, each of the 
three bodies of law serve distinct purposes and are understood to 
order differing aspects of ownership and control.154  Corresponding-
ly, the conventional view invites the conclusion that doctrinal 
conflicts are best resolved from within their respective range-
limited domains.  But choice of bankruptcy policy is crucial to in-
novation policy; rather than operating in the background, 
bankruptcy rules stand among the pillars of ownership and asset 
allocation and, importantly, ex ante incentives to creation.  Con-
ceptually speaking, relegating any set of rules governing asset 
allocation to the “background” is deceptive where a structural 
distribution is at stake.  From this perspective, aspects of bank-
ruptcy law hardly operate in the “background” of innovation 
policy but instead are better understood to be definitive of it; they 
are essential to the very construction of innovation policy and the 
structure of any monopolistic legal rules. 
Consider this significant and intractable doctrinal conflict—
drawn from outside traditional intellectual property doctrine—
here, in the context of bankruptcy law.  This conflict can be viewed 
as analogous, for present purposes, to the conflict surrounding 
the Useful Article Doctrine, drawn from within traditional 
intellectual property law.  The tension surrounding the Useful 
Article Doctrine helps demonstrate that traditional distinctions 
within intellectual property doctrine dissolve in the face of 
maximizing principles.  Analogously, the conflict surrounding the 
assumption of executory contracts involving intellectual property 
licenses helps show that doctrinal distinctions drawn between 
innovation policy and “background rules” drawn from outside tra-
ditional intellectual property doctrine are similarly unsustainable. 
Consider the eminent conflict.  A circuit split has emerged 
regarding the debtor-in-possession’s ability to assume patent 
licenses.155  In Perlman, the Ninth Circuit rejected the debtor-in-
possession’s attempt to assume a number of patent licenses, over 
 
153 Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 75, at 948–62. 
154 See MERGES, supra note 3, at 132; Samuelson, supra note 7, at 1514. See gener-
ally Menell & Yablon, supra note 7. 
155 See Menell, supra note 8, at 789. 
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the objection of the licensor.  In doing so, the court applied the so-
called “hypothetical test” under which “a debtor in possession 
may not assume an executory contract over the [licensor’s] 
objection if applicable law would bar assignment to a hypo-
thetical third party, even where the debtor in possession has no 
intention of assigning the contract in question to any such third 
party.”156  Here, “applicable law,” for purposes of section 365(c) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, governing the debtor in possession’s auth-
ority to assume executory contracts, is constructed as “federal 
patent law.”157  And, according to the latter, nonexclusive patent 
licenses are understood to be personal and nondelegable without 
the consent of the licensor.158 
Importantly, however, section 365(f)(1) strips nonassignability 
clauses from patent licenses, rendering them unenforceable.159  
This is an example, similar to the Bankruptcy Code’s nonenforce-
ment of ipso facto clauses,160 of the Code’s altering of state 
contract law in opposition to the Butner principle.161  But this, 
crucially, does not (automatically) implement a “free-assignability” 
regime.  Section 365(c)(1) calls for the application of “applicable 
law,”162 qua mandatory rules, to determine the assignability 
question.163  If federal patent law, as opposed to state law, is 
 
156 In re Catapult Ent., Inc., 165 F.3d at 750. 
157 Id.; see also id. at 749. 
158 See Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 680 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
159 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of 
this section, notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease 
of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assign-
ment of such contract or lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease under 
paragraph (2) of this subsection.”). 
160 See id. § 363(l); Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia 
Downs, Inc.), 5 B.R. 529, 531 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980). 
161 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are 
created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different 
result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply 
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”). But see infra 
note 173. 
162 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (“The trustee may not assume or assign any executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease 
prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—(1)(A) applic-
able law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from 
accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the 
debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or 
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and (B) such party does not 
consent to such assumption or assignment.”). 
163 Perlman v. Catapult Ent., Inc. (In re Catapult Ent., Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 752 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
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determined to be the relevant “applicable law” for reasons of 
uniformity, or more generally, reasons of patent policy,164 then 
nonassignability will be the rule, as nonexclusive licenses will be 
held to be personal and nondelegable. 
Such an outcome echoes the purported policy reasons for not 
allowing licenses to fall under what Everex describes as a “free-
assignability regime.”165  In this view, patent law ostensibly exists 
to foster innovation and creativity by granting the inventor the 
right to have monopolistic control of an innovation for a specified 
number of years.  The law also gives patent holders the right to 
give others a nonexclusive license to use the patent.  Under the 
federal common law of patents, a licensee cannot assign or transfer 
a license to a third party without the permission of the licensor.  
The controversial policy reason offered for this is that licensors 
must have the ability to control the identity of their licensees.  
Under a “free-assignability regime,” licensees could assign the 
license to a competitor of the licensor, even over the objection of 
the licensor.  On the other side of the ledger, crucially, limitations 
on assumption and assignability can be in tension with firm 
preservation, and therefore job preservation. 
In contrast, in Institut Pasteur, the First Circuit upheld the 
debtor-in-possession’s assumption of two patent licenses.  In doing 
so, the court rejected the “hypothetical test,”166 and instead applied 
the “ ‘actual performance’ test” under which assumption is al-
lowed unless the licensor would be “forced to accept performance 
under its executory contract from someone other than the debtor 
party with whom it originally contracted.”167  While both cases 
were purportedly about assumption, they notably touched on the 
assignability question as well.  Although both the “hypothetical 
 
164 Menell, supra note 8, at 792 n.211 (“The Erie doctrine . . . leaves room for 
federal courts to apply federal common law rules where a specific showing has been 
made that applying state law will create conflict or will pose a threat to some federal 
policy or interest.”). 
165 Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
166 Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 
1997) (citing Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 612 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
167 Id. (quoting Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp., 69 F.3d at 612); see also DOUGLAS G. 
BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 133 (5th ed. 2010) (comparing Perlman with 
Institut Pasteur and concluding that “[t]he law here remains in flux. The most im-
portant cases have involved patent licenses. Some courts have found ways to read 
the statute in a way that allows the debtor in possession to continue to use patent 
licenses even though non-bankruptcy law provides that they are not assumable. 
Other courts, invoking Supreme Court opinions that mandate fidelity to statutory 
text in bankruptcy, have refused to do so.”). 
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test” and the “ ‘actual performance’ test” would seemingly prohibit 
reassignments to third parties, the debtor-in-possession in Perlman 
was merging with a third party as part of its reorganization plan, 
and the debtor-in-possession in Institut Pasteur was being ac-
quired by a major competitor of the licensor by a stock sale.  
Yet—ignoring the de facto merger doctrine168—the court in the 
latter case rejected the argument that the transaction was in 
substance an assignment, stating that “[s]tock sales are not 
mergers whereby outright title and ownership of the licensee-
corporation’s assets (including its patent licenses) pass to the 
acquiring corporation.”169  The court rejected Institut Pasteur’s 
argument that the generic nonassignability provisions in the 
license agreements barred the debtor-in-possession from—in 
effect—“assigning” the licenses to Institut Pasteur’s competitor.170  
Counterintuitively, the court held that the generic nonassign-
ability clause was not specific enough to address the circum-
stances between the debtor-in-possession and the competitor.171  
The court argued that if Institut Pasteur had been concerned 
about its licenses being transferred to competitors, it should have 
specifically written a detailed, as opposed to generic, nonassign-
ability provision into the cross-license agreements addressing 
that issue.172 
It is notable that in determining “applicable law” for the 
purposes of section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, courts have a 
range of options, whether or not consistent with the Butner 
principle.173  For example, under California law, patent licenses 
are freely assignable,174 but under federal common law, patent 
 
168 See generally Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958). 




173 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 51–54 (1979). The Butner principle is it-
self, arguably indeterminate or simply wrong. See Barry E. Adler, The Questionable 
Axiom of Butner v. United States, in BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES 11, 19 (Robert K. 
Rasmussen ed., 2007) (“The Butner principle notwithstanding, then, useful bank-
ruptcy reform might include highest priority for nonconsensual claims.”); Lawrence 
Ponoroff, Whither Recharacterization, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1217, 1263 (2016) 
(“Thus, to conclude that state law would regard a particular investment as a 
loan . . . is, if not entirely meaningless, certainly not decisive, and by no means does 
it signal the end of the inquiry. . . . [T]o leave the matter to be decided based on the 
purely serendipitous rubrics of state law is hardly prudent; it is not mandated by the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Butner and it is certainly no way to run the railroad.” 
(emphasis added)). 
174 Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1957). 
2020] MAXIMIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 47 
licenses are constructed as personal and nondelegable.175  The 
choice would, importantly, dramatically affect the value of pat-
ents and therefore reflects competing conceptions of the strength 
of monopolistic protection.  As the court noted in Everex, in the 
former regime “every licensee would become a potential 
competitor with the licensor-patent holder in the market for 
licenses under the patents.”176  As the court argued, “[a]llowing 
free assignability . . . of nonexclusive patent licenses would 
undermine the reward that encourages invention,”177 rendering 
patents less valuable. 
True, such a regime would render patents less valuable to 
would-be licensors, but this is, of course, to view patents in iso-
lation.  It is far from clear that the policy reasons surrounding 
incentives of product innovation supporting the patent system, in 
the first instance, further justify such strong protection of the 
right to license or contract over such patents.  Patents are in place 
to serve as incentive to innovation, but, notably, one must attend 
closely to the strength of patent protection, including, for exam-
ple, the barrier to entry and the lifespan, as well as the separable 
question of licensing rights over patents.  Given the preceding dis-
cussion, the concern becomes plain.  Courts are myopically looking 
only at one side of the ledger.  Any added incentive to innovation 
that is derived from (1) monopolistic protection conjoined with 
(2) the added, yet controversial, contract right concerning a 
prohibition on nonconsensual assignability, must be balanced 
against the potential deadweight loss associated with firm failure 
and the social loss associated with it.  This quickly becomes a tall 
order, as we saw above.  From a maximizing perspective, the fact 
of the monopoly alone can be difficult to justify, given the initial 
deadweight loss, and here there is the added concern of firm 
failure.  Even if ultimately correct, the courts provide essentially 
a conclusion, as opposed to an analysis of the actual policy 
reasons supporting the patent system.  Such an analysis would 
need to balance the equities concerning innovation ex ante and 
the deadweight loss created ex post. 
One way to understand the assignability issue surrounding 
patent licenses is to view it from a remedial perspective.  In both 
 
175 Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679–80 
(9th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases from the D.C. Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Seventh Circuit, 
and Eighth Circuit). 
176 Id. at 679. 
177 Id. 
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Perlman and Institut Pasteur, the licensors are in effect arguing 
that their patent licenses should be protected by what Calabresi 
and Melamed have described as property rule protection.178  
While restructuring is not a remedial matter, there is an 
important analogous insight at play here.  The licensor wishes to 
retain complete control over the assignability of patent licenses; 
following Everex, the Perlman court appears to believe that such 
legal protection is most consistent with what the court takes to 
be the justification of monopolistic rules.  This so-called product 
innovation theme yields the conclusion that such licenses ought 
not to be assignable absent the consent of the licensor, unless the 
ex ante policy reasons surrounding monopolistic protection are 
essentially defeated.  But it does not follow directly that, where 
patents are infringed, courts automatically grant injunctive 
relief; patent protection is simply not always quite so absolute.  A 
four-factor balancing test is required and there is always the 
possibility of damages, as opposed to injunctions,179 or what 
Calabresi and Melamed have described as liability rule pro-
tection.180  The point is analogous to the remedial context; a less 
contractualist rule, something akin to liability rule protection of 
the licenses, for example, may well be consistent with the full 
balance policy reasons for monopolistic protection in the first 
instance.  
Consider Perlman and Institut Pasteur in light of principles 
aimed at wealth maximization or the position of the least well-off.  
There are essentially three issues at stake.  First, the courts are 
taking as a given monopolistic protection, but, as we have seen, the 
very question of monopolistic protection is an open one, from both 
of these maximizing perspectives.181  Still, assume briefly, for the 
 
178 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) 
(discussing property versus liability rules). 
179 See Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 4, at 1329, 1331 (discussing the remedi-
al aspects of patent infringement in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 54 U.S. 388 
(2006), in terms of property and liability rules). Recently elaborating and expanding 
upon this idea, see Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability 
Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007); Christopher B. Seaman, 
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA 
L. REV. 1949 (2016); Carl Shapiro, Property Rules vs. Liability Rules for Patent In-
fringement, (May 4, 2016) (unpublished article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2775307 
[https://perma.cc/H4YE-4KYG]; cf. Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. 
Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent 
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012). 
180 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 178. 
181 See supra Section IV.A. 
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sake of argument, that some level of monopolistic protection is 
justified from both the perspective of wealth maximization and 
the Rawlsian difference principle.  There are still two further issues: 
first, the construction of patent licenses as personal and 
nondelegable, effectively creating an added contractual right to—
and possible windfall for—licensors, simply by dint of filing for 
bankruptcy; and second, the question of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
stripping of nonassignability clauses. 
Absent reference to a governing, external principle of owner-
ship, attempts to resolve these questions may appear forced or 
somewhat arbitrary.  At its core, the question is one of asset 
allocation: Should the deadweight loss associated with the 
nondelegable patent licenses—for example, the possibility of the 
public and private cost of firm failure—be borne by the debtor-in-
possession, even where important jobs are at risk or socially 
necessary AIDS research is at stake?  Or, on the other hand, 
should needed medical advances—here AIDS research—and job 
preservation, be viewed as costs associated with successful 
innovation?  The question of what-is-the-cost-of-what182 cannot be 
non-arbitrarily answered absent an external or principled ac-
count of ownership, but, importantly, differing external accounts 
of ownership may well yield distinct resolutions. 
On one hand, still on the assumption that there would even 
be monopolistic protection, a wealth-maximizing approach might 
construct patent licenses as personal and nondelegable and 
disallow section 365(f)(1)’s stripping of nonassignability clauses.  
This could occur based on the belief that the ability to privately 
order via transferable rights, that is, a more contractual approach, 
is conducive to the relentless aim of maximizing net-aggregate 
wealth.  On the other hand, a Rawlsian approach aimed not at 
wealth maximization but, instead, at the economic position of the 
least well-off, may perhaps look less favorably upon the Everex 
court’s added enforceability of the nonassignability clause—that 
is, an added contractual right and windfall to patent licensors—
from the perspective of California law.183 
Importantly, Rawlsianism typically takes a more constrained 
view of private ordering and, correspondingly, closes contractual 
options that are, from a structural perspective, deleterious to the 
economic position of the least well-off.  Crucially, with regard to 
 
182 See generally CALABRESI, supra note 13.  
183 See Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1957). 
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the Bankruptcy Code, the Rawlsian might have a comparatively 
greater “firm-continuation” bias over the wealth-maximizing 
position, given the social values at stake.  A Rawlsian might, for 
example, insert an, in effect, “free assignability” mandatory rule, 
as in Farmland Irrigation Co.,184 upholding California law.  So, 
where a Rawlsian might attribute the social value of would-be 
firm restructuring to licensors, the wealth-maximizing principle 
may attribute the same cost to the debtor-in-possession, in effect 
leaving the question to private ordering.  Notably consistent with 
this view, in discussing the Bankruptcy Code’s typical rejection of 
anti-assignment clauses,185 Alan Schwartz argues, from a wealth-
maximizing perspective, that if one recognizes the function of the 
Coase Theorem,186 nothing is gained in terms of wealth max-
imization compared to a contractual or private ordering approach 
to bankruptcy that upholds anti-assignment clauses.187  In short, 
Schwartz argues that the debtor-in-possession would bargain for 
rights were they more valuable in its hands. 
On the other hand, there may be some wrinkles in this ap-
proach.  First is the very assumption that wealth maximization 
would even admit of such monopolistic rules; it may well bear a 
differing conception of innovation policy.  But if we allow monop-
olistic protection, again, if only for the sake of argument, 
bargaining and information problems may inhibit such seamless 
transactions,188 as too might wealth effects, particularly relevant 
in the context of an insolvent debtor.  Indeed, such breakdown is 
often, in a remedial context, the justification for providing liability 
rule, over property rule, protection.189  It is unclear that the ap-
plication of property rule protection would be maximally 
conducive to achieving wealth maximization.  But, crucially, the 
application of property versus liability rule protection, for exam-
ple, would turn on the specific circumstances surrounding the case.  
Consider the scenario in Institut Pasteur, where the debtor-in-
possession was the licensee of patents related to AIDS research.190  
 
184 Id. at 739. 
185 11 U.S.C. § 365(c), (f) (2018). 
186 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–6 (1960). 
187 Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1847–49. 
188 See Coase, supra note 186, at 2. See generally Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining 
Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253 (John H. Kagel 
& Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (describing Ultimatum Game results).  
189 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 178, at 1106–10 (discussing property 
versus liability rules). 
190 Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 490 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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Assume that the debtor-in-possession is best positioned to find a 
cure.  It would seem that the demand of wealth maximization 
would require the assignment of the patent license rights to the 
debtor-in-possession.  Yet the private interests of the two firms 
might point in the opposite direction.  In short, the wealth-max-
imization principle, in this highly stylized case, might require the 
closing of more libertarian-oriented contractual outcomes and 
ultimately require a mandatory rule as opposed to allowing 
private ordering. 
V.  ENTITLEMENT EQUILIBRIUM 
A. Synchronicity 
Given the preceding example drawn from bankruptcy, it 
begins to become clear that, from a maximizing perspective, 
analyses of intellectual property and innovation policy cannot be 
limited to traditional doctrine—for example, patent, copyright, 
and trademark—to the exclusion of so-called background rules of 
entitlement, or the analysis will be importantly incomplete.  
However, such a constrained focus on traditional intellectual 
property doctrine is understandable or even, initially, laudable.  
One must of course start somewhere, and legal doctrine is often 
parceled into readily digestible modules or canonically defined 
subject areas for reasons of simplicity and practicality.  In the 
context of maximizing aims or goals, it is true that the 
interconnections among all legal rules are in play.  However, the 
law might construct modules or subcomponents to dampen the 
possibility of deleterious interconnection, and such partitioning 
may, for example, make law easier to modify and less susceptible 
to systemic or cascading error. 
Importantly, however, were legal subcomponents or modules 
constructed, in the context of maximizing goals, there is still the 
open question of how to draw the very boundaries that define the 
modules or subcomponents.  In the face of maximizing aims, the 
modules would likely be drawn in a fashion distinct from 
traditional doctrinal accounts, by, for example, employing fewer 
sharp distinctions between doctrinal bodies of law that can create 
unnecessary overlap or conflict.  What might count as the “pe-
riphery” versus the “central features” of a particular body or 
subcomponent of law would likely shift from the perspective of 
traditional legal doctrine, to one contingent upon the substance 
of the maximizing principle. 
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That said, where one is concerned with maximizing princi-
ples, focus on traditional or given doctrinal legal modules or 
subcomponents can admit of a form of myopia that can, in turn, 
serve to disguise structural inefficiencies or systemic injustice.  
Such focus isolates one group of legal rules from among all 
property and entitlement-defining, incentive-creating legal 
rules—namely, those surrounding patent, copyright, and trade-
mark—to the erroneous exclusion of other equally important 
rules, from the perspective of maximization.  This further tends 
to camouflage the potential incompatibility of maximizing princi-
ples with such independent modules of intellectual property.  
Importantly, viewing intellectual property in isolation can invite 
a certain form of incomplete understanding.  The trouble arises 
as a function of an understandable, if mistaken, omission: a 
failure to recognize that in the context of maximizing principles, 
there is a distributive symmetry between all legal rules that 
define ownership, the details of control, and asset allocation.  
This requirement of symmetry would remain true, whether such 
rules are associated with intellectual property, as conventionally 
understood, or the broader body of private law rules drawn, for 
example, from bankruptcy or the rules governing taxation and 
transfer.  An important synchronicity is required. 
Where one’s ultimate consideration is a maximizing end, the 
private law, inclusive of intellectual property, is of purely 
instrumentalist value.191  To help make this point clear, consider 
the following: property and the bounds of the private law, from 
this maximizing perspective, bear a reciprocal relationship to 
taxation and transfer.  As Anthony Kronman has noted, from a 
distributive perspective, a fifty-percent tax on ordinary income 
can equally well be characterized as a rule of taxation, a rule of 
property, or a rule of contract law.192  The correct conclusion to be 
drawn is that the rules of each complete set of “property-
oriented” legal rules operate in conjunction with one another in 
setting entitlements.  Taken collectively, all such rules construct 
 
191 Interestingly, the point can be pushed beyond the context of the present 
discussion. A differing set of entitlement-oriented legal rules might be required 
where differing countries or economies have distinct economic goals. For example, 
one focusing on a competitive advantage in higher education might have different 
entitlement rules from an economy or country focused on a competitive advantage in 
health care. But still, internal synchronicity would be required between background 
and foreground rules, although the rules of the two schemes would differ. 
192 See generally Kronman, supra note 14, at 501–05. 
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economic baselines and benchmarks necessary to evaluating 
innovation policy from the perspective of maximizing principles. 
B. Entitlement Optimality 
Consider the traditionalist or independent doctrinal perspec-
tive, again.  Where one, for example, aims to maximize the 
position of the least well-off, a seemingly acceptable or just set of 
monopolistic rules, where viewed in isolation, risks being 
shipwrecked when injected into a set of legal rules that defines 
entitlements in any fashion deleterious to the position of the 
least well-off.  Even where a set of monopolistic innovation rules 
appears acceptable in isolation, once conjoined with a distribu-
tively incongruous set of legal rules, the conjunction may fail to 
maximize.  Or, worse still, it may even serve to further exacerbate 
deleterious risks to the economic position of the least well-off. 
Any deleterious effects associated with misalignment, how-
ever, cannot simply be offset through the use of taxation and 
transfer, as one might naturally think.  Importantly, differing 
maximizing principles impose upon legal institutions a specified 
demand for a unique set of optimal property-oriented legal rules, 
whether monopolistic protection or otherwise, conjoined with a 
uniquely optimal tax rate.193  That is, the optimal complete set of 
property-oriented rules constructed by the wealth-maximizing 
principle is distinct from the optimal set of rules constructed by 
the Rawlsian difference principle,194 although the two will likely 
admit of a range or domain of empirical overlap.  Analogously, 
the wealth-maximization principle and the Rawlsian difference 
principle each require a unique optimal rate of taxation.195 
It follows from this that the question of innovation policy, 
whether monopolistic protection or otherwise, say, taxation and 
prizes, is not “open” or “free” in the context of maximizing prin-
 
193 Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 4, at 1346 (“The selection among com-
peting IP regimes . . . must be constructed in conjunction with an optimal tax and 
transfer system, unique to the . . . principles of justice. Intra-schemic alterations in 
the complete set of legal rules will require changes in taxation and upset, at the very 
least, the optimal tax rates and tax base, thereby causing a failure to meet the 
maximizing demands.”). Cf. Dimick, supra note 2, at 40 (noting the need to alter 
legal rules, but not the uniquely optimal tax rate). 
194 Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 4, at 1347 (“[T]he conception of what is op-
timal changes when one shifts between maximands. What is optimal for a utilitarian 
regime (maximizing net aggregate utility) cannot also be optimal for a Rawlsian 
(maximizing the position of the least well-off).” (emphasis omitted)). 
195 Id. at 1347 (“Maximizing principles require a specific set of property rules 
conjoined with an optimal tax rate.”). 
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ciples.196  The concern here can become acute; if the initial group 
of property-oriented rules, monopoly protection or otherwise, are 
not set optimally in service to the respective maximand, the slack 
will have to be picked up through the system of taxation and 
transfer.  But, importantly, alterations to the tax rate cannot be 
cost-free; there is a fixed optimal tax rate in play, and upward or 
downward manipulations from the optimal tax rate will cause 
further economic distortion and an ultimate failure to maximize 
value.  From a maximizing perspective, the conjunction of opti-
mal entitlement rules and optimal taxation rates is a necessary, 
if seemingly underappreciated, constraint on institutional design 
that creates greater determinacy in the selection of intellectual 
property rules and innovation policy. 
The matter quickly becomes complex, and it is important to 
understand what is at stake; taxation, whether based upon in-
come, consumption, or endowment, does not merely operate upon 
a set of given rules that statically define ownership in the first 
instance.  Where one is goal driven, as is the case in the context 
of maximizing principles, the tax rate depends upon the structure 
of the very rules that define ownership, and, conversely, the 
structure of these rules depends upon the tax rate—an equilibri-
um is critical.  Where the complete set of legal rules is set in a 
non-optimal fashion, legal institutions will fail to maximize 
value.  True, one might always attempt to offset losses associated 
with a less-than-optimal set of private law rules, such as too 
much monopolistic protection and an inefficient bankruptcy 
regime, through positive or negative alterations in the tax rate, 
for example.  But any such changes drive the tax rate away from 
its optimal home or baseline, and the required equilibrium will 
fail to obtain.  That is, a less than efficient set of legal rules, in-
clusive of inefficient monopoly protection, bankruptcy rules, or 
otherwise, cannot be merely offset or compensated through 
changes in the taxation rate, absent additional distortion.  
Alterations or departures from optimality in tax rates are simply 
not cost-free197 and will, therefore, create an inefficient equi-
librium.  Absent synchronicity between the unique complete set 
 
196 Id. at 1346–48; Blankfein-Tabachnick & Kordana, Kaplow and Shavell and 
the Priority of Income Taxation and Transfer, supra note 2, at 34. 
197 Blankfein-Tabachnick, supra note 4, at 1346–48; Blankfein-Tabachnick & 
Kordana, Kaplow and Shavell and the Priority of Income Taxation and Transfer, 
supra note 2, at 34 (“[M]oves away from optimal taxation are not cost free.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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of optimal ownership and entailment rules, there will be a mis-
alignment that, in turn, will cause a distortion in optimal tax-
ation rates and ultimately an inefficient equilibrium will obtain. 
It follows from this that where maximization is the aim, 
property entitlements—inclusive of innovation policy—cannot be 
set in isolation of concerns over optimal taxation rates.  A maxi-
mizing demand requires an optimal set of property entitlements 
conjoined with an optimal taxation rate.  This crucial but under-
appreciated relationship can confound thinking at the intersec-
tion of innovation policy and maximizing principles.  From the 
externalist perspective of Rawlsian or wealth-maximizing accounts 
of intellectual property, it is quite natural to observe notable 
inefficiencies or injustices surrounding the construction of mo-
nopolistic entitlement in the positive law and commend a system 
of taxes and prizes as incentives to innovation, as a corrective to 
such perceived flaws.  But here, one must fully appreciate the 
required synchronicity between rules governing entitlements and 
their relationship to taxation.  Omitting to recognize the unique 
constraints imposed by optimal taxation and optimal entitlement 
rule construction in the context of differential maximizing 
distributive principles, will result in an incomplete, or even in-
correct, assessment of innovation policy. 
Disparate areas of law, traditionally conceived, might at 
times be viewed as having little in common with one another, but 
from a distributive perspective they bear a critical symmetry and 
cannot be properly evaluated in isolation.  Since bodies of positive 
law are not without internal flaws, it is quite natural to turn to 
external principles for corrective guidance, as observed in the 
copyright and bankruptcy examples.  True, where the positive law 
embodies inefficiencies and palpable economic injustices—or is 
best viewed as a simple hodgepodge, as seen in the doctrinal 
conflicts surrounding copyright and bankruptcy law above—most 
reasonable alterations would, as an empirical matter, likely 
improve both net-aggregate wealth and the position of the least 
well-off.  But, importantly, “improving” is neither “maximizing,” 
nor “optimizing.”  The observation, for example, that the positive 
law enjoins an inefficient or unjust measure of deadweight loss, 
derived from too much monopolistic protection (in terms of 
breadth or length of patent life) is insufficient to motivate the 
claim that from a maximizing perspective, a taxation and prizes 
regime is superior to monopolistic protection, although it very 
well may be. 
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In light of the preceding discussion of background-foreground 
synchronicity, optimal rule construction, and optimal taxation 
rates, consider the germane aspects of the current mature schol-
arly debate surrounding innovation policy that appear to leave 
this observation unacknowledged. 
Working from a Rawlsian perspective, Thomas Pogge has 
prominently advocated for a system of taxation and prizes, as an 
egalitarian replacement to the present, objectionably, inegalitarian 
patent system enshrined in the positive law.198  Pogge astutely 
observes that current patent law admits of numerous inefficiencies 
surrounding the production and distribution of pharmaceuticals, 
but he draws specific attention to the deadweight loss caused by 
monopolistic protection’s quashing would-be win-win transactions 
over generic medications, in a fashion deleterious to the world’s 
most vulnerable.199  True, Pogge has drawn needed attention to 
the inefficiencies and inequality surrounding the current system 
and its significant risk to the least well-off.  In addition, Pogge 
may well be correct that any reasonably well-conceived system of 
taxation and prizes would be a structural improvement to the 
presently distorted patent system, and he has raised both schol-
arly and global awareness of the question of whether or not the 
patent system can be justified from the perspective of least well-
off. 
Still, noting the distorted or objectionable nature of the 
positive law, as argued above, it is insufficient to show that a 
scheme of taxation and prizes is preferable to all possible systems 
of monopolistic protection.  Here, importantly, the concern is not 
over the question of whether or not Pogge is correct—he may 
very well be—it is instead over the form the analysis should take 
in making the determination.  Straight away, the analysis involves 
an inter-schemic comparison of complete sets of legal rules and 
their respective instrumentalist role in meeting the maximizing 
principle.  At the same time, one must attend to the fact that 
shifts away from monopolistic legal rules as incentive and in 
favor of taxation and prizes reduce deadweight loss associated 
with monopolistic rules but, at the same time, increase dead-
weight loss associated with an increase in tax rates and its 
attended distortion of the labor/leisure trade-off. 
 
198 INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 6. 
199 Id. 
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Similarly, Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypersele, arguing 
from a wealth-maximizing perspective, have also compared a 
scheme of taxation and rewards or prizes to a scheme of monop-
olistic rules, in contemplating innovation policy.200  The two, like 
Pogge, note inefficiencies associated with monopolistic rules, but 
Shavell and Van Ypersele also recognize flaws associated with a 
strict scheme of taxation and rewards.201  For them, the chief 
concern surrounds needed information in determining the 
taxation and reward system.202  As a remedy to this flaw in such 
a taxation and reward based system, the two argue that “an 
optional reward system—under which an innovator can choose 
between a reward and intellectual property rights—is superior to 
the intellectual property rights system.”203  Here, the aim is the 
construction of an optimal scheme, from the perspective of wealth 
maximization, but, at the same time, Shavell and Van Ypersele 
openly recognize that a reward system would have to be financed 
through taxation and transfer, presumably an income taxation.204  
The two further note that this would involve a labor-supply, 
distortionary cost, and that this tax-based distortion was not 
recognized in their model; therefore, the case for the reward 
system they advance is less strong than even their own analysis 
suggests.205 
Further, Lewis Kaplow, also writing from a wealth-maximizing 
perspective, has articulated a clear and needed account of an 
optimal patent system and notably concludes from this account 
that an innovation policy system absent monopolistic protection 
is a very real possibility.206  He holds that an optimal patent 
system is attained when the total social benefits maximally 
exceed the social costs, “[t]hus, all that can be known about the 
relationship between total benefits and costs at the optimal 
patent life is that total benefits exceed total costs; if this . . . were 
not true, the optimization process would have indicated that 
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there should be no patent system at all.”207  Notably, here, the 
question of patent lifespan would play a prominent role in the 
analysis of optimal monopoly protection.  This optimal lifespan, as 
well as breadth of subject matter, may go some distance in the di-
rection of remedying some of Pogge’s objections to the positive 
law.  
As noted, Kaplow’s analysis, self-consciously, defines a sys-
tem of monopolistic rules as incentives to innovation at its best.208  
Notably, the account is in isolation and operates against the 
assumption that the model, if implemented, would operate in the 
context of a set of antecedently constructed background rules, 
replete with attention to egalitarian or distributive concerns—
say, the correct shifting value between consumers and producers.209  
But, Kaplow’s analysis of “optimal” is in isolation; here, one must 
be careful.  It is important not to conclude too much from 
Kaplow’s definition of an optimal patent policy.  As Kaplow aptly 
notes, if this much cannot be said on behalf of the patent system, 
it simply should not exist.  But, importantly, as Kaplow also 
notes, it does not strictly follow that it should exist simply 
because the relationship described can be attained.  Here, 
Kaplow’s account of optimal is limited to the narrow domain of 
monopolistic protection; even where a patent system is optimal, 
in the sense he describes, it does not directly follow that such a 
patent system is the optimal innovation policy scheme.  The 
proper comparison is not among competing schemes involving 
monopolistic protection; that would be simply to weigh-in in favor 
of the monopolistic protection, ex ante.  Instead, the proper 
comparison is among all competing schemes and how they 
respectively fare in meeting the demands of the maximizing 
principle. 
Notably, however, even if such a patent scheme were to be 
the innovation policy selected from the perspective of wealth 
maximization, in light of the preceding analysis, it does not 
follow that the identical monopolistic regime would be selected 
from the perspective of maximizing the position of the least well-
off.  As argued above, differing maximizing principles require 
unique sets of entitlement-governing legal rules.  When one shifts 
between external principles, say, the wealth-maximization prin-
ciple and the Rawlsian difference principle, one, by definition, 
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decreases the size of the “economic pie” for distributive reasons 
based in equality.  But in doing so, prices endogenous to the new, 
smaller, and more distributively just scheme change; for example, 
luxury goods quickly disappear, and surplus income is reduced.  
Given the wealth effects associated with the change in maxi-
mizing principles, rules governing entitlement must change too if 
they are to serve the maximand.  At stake is the question of how 
property-oriented legal rules, in the new egalitarian scheme, will 
be structured.  Thus, were a patent system meeting, for example, 
Kaplow’s conception of optimality, where total benefits exceed 
total costs in isolation, to merely eek-out its justification in a 
complete wealth-maximizing scheme of legal rules, it would 
likely fail to be adopted in a scheme focused on maximizing the 
position of the least well-off. 
Daniel Hemel and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, in recent path-
breaking work, have produced an innovative framework for 
thinking about innovation policy; one arguably congenial to both 
a Rawlsian and wealth-maximizing perspective.210  The two rec-
ognize that monopolistic protection is not a given;211 intellectual 
property should be more broadly conceived as innovation policy, 
as opposed to a limited range of canonical doctrine.212  Set this 
way, innovation policy has a variety of modal options at its 
disposal: monopolistic protection, taxation and rewards, tax 
credits, and grants.213  Hemel and Ouellette point out that each of 
these modalities bears two separable aspects: an incentive 
component and an allocative component.  One way to understand 
Hemel and Ouellette is as brilliantly articulating a form of a “de-
coupling” argument, familiar in the context of tortious liability, 
where an optimal liability system would allow that a damage 
award to the plaintiff be distinct, perhaps lower, than the total 
payment required from the defendant.214  In the tort context, this 
form of “decoupling” is taken to be more efficient than the 
present system because it potentially preserves incentives to take 
reasonable care, while lowering incentives for plaintiffs to sue, 
thereby, lowering litigation costs.215  The incentives necessary to 
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ensure the correct number of lawsuits is not the same as the 
payment necessary to “optimal” deterrence; a bifurcation or de-
coupling can, then, be value-added.216   
In the innovation context, Hemel and Ouellette creatively 
note that the incentive component, representing the payout to the 
innovator, can be decoupled from the allocative component that 
constructs rules governing the terms under which consumers can 
avail themselves of the “knowledge goods.”217  Hemel and Ouellette 
further argue that various modalities can be combined with one 
another, in a modular fashion, to produce an “optimal” innova-
tion policy; their analysis addresses both ex-ante and ex-post 
considerations.218  For example, one might conjoin the incentive 
component of the monopolistic modality with the allocative com-
ponent of the prize system.  Further, the government could pur-
chase knowledge goods, once brought to market, from patent 
holders at an objective price and then create an open-access 
regime.  The insight here is that the decoupling would provide 
sufficient incentive to producers but reduce the deadweight loss 
associated with monopolistic rules.  And, importantly, further ef-
ficiency still can be gained by conjoining modules from the same 
side of the incentive/allocation divide; a grant might be coupled 
with monopolistic protection of a shorter than typical lifespan, 
where the grant alone might be insufficient to cover research and 
development.219   
Return now to the above concern over optimal taxation.  
Hemel and Ouellette’s chief concern in institutional design is the 
creation of an “optimal” innovation policy, initially from the per-
spective of welfare-maximization, but they immediately recognize 
that such an “optimal” innovation policy can significantly conflict 
with concerns of distributive justice.220  The two point out that 
the flexibility surrounding their modular approach may be effec-
tive in offsetting the distributive flaws associated with an optimal 
approach.  They note that differential arrangements might be 
invoked for differential types of knowledge goods to account for 
distributive justice.  The idea, roughly, is that, from the per-
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spective of distributive justice, the justification for taxation and 
prizes is stronger in the context of public goods, as a solution to a 
market failure or where the basic rights of the poor are at issue, 
and weaker where the knowledge goods surround, say, luxury 
products.221 
For example, the economic incentives needed for lifesaving 
pharmaceuticals aimed at treating diseases disproportionately 
afflicting the poor would be better implemented by a system of 
broad taxation and prizes rather than by monopolistic protection 
or an equivalent point-of-sale “user pays” consumption tax.222  At 
the same time, they argue that distributive concerns might 
suggest that innovation focused on advances in luxury goods 
would be best incentivized by monopolistic rules, or, perhaps, a 
user-pays, consumption-tax scheme.223  The idea is the common-
sense notion that it appears unjust to use general taxpayer funds 
to incentivize innovation in luxury goods that chiefly benefit the 
wealthy.  At work here is a limited defense of the “user pays” 
principle of taxation; those who benefit should bear the cost.  So, 
a mixed system of incentives is thought to be helpful in reme-
dying perceived distributive flaws associated with the initial 
optimal scheme constructed of Hemel and Ouellette’s set of mod-
ular options.  They write:  
[T]he optimal allocation mechanism is one of open access 
because there is no information to be gained from proprietary 
pricing.  The government can minimize deadweight loss through 
non-IP innovation incentives such as prizes, grants, or tax 
credits, and it can set the size of the reward correctly without 
relying on observed willingness to pay.  But consider a case 
where the relevant knowledge good is a luxury product con-
sumed primarily by the wealthy. . . .  Even though the knowl-
edge good may be socially beneficial, the benefit accrues to a 
segment of society that is not ordinarily thought to be the 
proper beneficiary of government redistribution.  Since the 
government has only finite resources, the allocative-efficiency 
benefits of open access must be weighed against the 
distributional consequences of using public funds to pay for 
advances that benefit only the rich.  Under these circumstances, 
policy makers might decide that they still want to rely on a 
user-pays model to some degree, though perhaps not entirely. 
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To be sure, an alternative approach might be to combine a 
non-IP innovation incentive and an open-access allocation 
mechanism with adjustments to the tax-and-transfer system 
that offset the distributional consequences of the subsidy for 
luxury goods.  Yet if there are insuperable political obstacles to 
tax-and-transfer reform, then policy makers might decide that 
the best available option is one in which users pay some, if not 
all, of the cost of the innovator’s reward.224 
Hemel and Ouellette’s work breaks significant ground and pro-
vides welcome relief from traditional or doctrinal approaches to 
innovation policy; the modular approach is highly congenial to a 
maximizing scheme requiring synchronicity among background 
and foreground rules.  Their modules may be implemented in 
constructing a complete scheme of legal rules, set to maximize 
welfare, wealth, or the position of the least well-off.  But still, 
there is a concern over optimal taxation.  The two recognize, as a 
pragmatic matter, that one may not be able to move seamlessly 
between taxes and legal rules, due to political or legislative 
impediments to creating optimal combinations.225  But there is a 
concern that runs deeper; the important issue surrounding 
optimal legal rules and optimal taxation rates arises here, yet 
again. 
Once one acknowledges that the initial scheme is “optimal,” 
as Hemel and Ouellette have, from a welfare-maximization 
perspective, but wrought with distributive flaws, one cannot 
simply alter the rules governing taxation or the entitlement-
governing aspects of the private law while remaining true to the 
initial optimal relationship or equilibrium, here derived from the 
welfare-maximizing principle.  Consistent, I believe, with much of 
Hemel and Ouellette’s position, synchronicity is required among 
background and innovation policy rules, be they rules governing 
insolvency, private law, taxation, etc. 
But once optimality is in place, any significant changes to 
the relationship among legal rules governing taxation, entitle-
ment, incentives and allocation, will distort the optimal taxation 
rate, which will, in turn, alter prices and shrink the economic pie 
from the perspective of the initial baseline.  Where optimality is a 
goal and an initial equilibrium is attained, one cannot simply add 
“new” intra-schemic alterations—in an egalitarian or more 
distributively just direction—and assume that the initial equilib-
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rium will hold.  One cannot trust, for example, that the initial rate 
of production of needed pharmaceuticals for the poor will not 
decrease.  The parameters of the initial optimal open-access regime 
were set in conjunction with a specified optimal taxation rate.  
Increasing the price of luxury goods, in effect, will alter the 
optimal balance.  Remedying the perceived distributional flaw 
associated with the production of luxury goods, as Hemel and 
Ouellette suggest, in a wealth-maximizing system, may only 
serve to create other further distributive flaws elsewhere in the 
system.  For example, were the added luxury-consumption tax to 
shrink the market in luxury goods, this could create further 
scarcity in revenue for the government’s funding of prizes necessary 
to incentivize innovation in medications that disproportionately 
aid the poor.  True, this scarcity could be met by increasing the 
income tax rate, but only at the cost of creating a further 
distortion associated with the departure from the initially 
optimal taxation rate; now, further mismatched with a non-
optimal set of entitlement-governing legal rules, the distortion 
could become acute. 
Where an optimal equilibrium is established, some tinkering 
may likely be required to bring the system into reflective 
equilibrium with considered judgements over the complete sys-
tem; rules can be under- and over-inclusive, and there is not always 
a perfect fit.226  But, by invoking an independent (traditional) 
module of tax policy like the “user pays” principle, a species of 
the benefit principle,227 to govern an entire sector of the market, 
is to go beyond mere adjustments required for reflective 
equilibrium.  One way to see the problem is this: the very notion 
of “benefit” requires an entitlement baseline or benchmark; for 
example, an answer to the question of which health conditions 
count as “diseases” or the magnitude of public provision of a 
social safety net.  The initial benchmark is required to determine 
whether or not a particular advance is, indeed, a benefit, or 
simply part of the initial baseline distribution.  Were the initial 
optimal open-access regime constructed broadly enough to 
provide for innovation associated with curing male-pattern 
baldness, to use Hemel and Ouellette’s example,228 the would-be 
market in such innovation would be endogenous to the initial 
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equilibrium; removing it from the balance would upset the 
scheme.  One way to understand the issue is this: the tax base 
itself is endogenous; one cannot simply layer a new taxation 
metric and hold true to the initial equilibrium.  Maintaining an 
initial optimal equilibrium requires attention to synchronicity 
among both the rules governing innovation policy and 
(deceptively described) background rules in which innovation 
policy finds its home, and, in turn, requires a specific optimal 
taxation rate.  Where one is committed to optimality among 
background rules and innovation policy as well as distributive 
justice, as Hemel and Ouellette are, what is needed is an 
external maximizing principle specifically selected to construct a 
set of legal rules, inclusive of the decoupled innovation policy, 
that does not admit of the disfavored distributive flaws—whether 
the Rawlsian difference principle, or otherwise.  These insights, 
of course, go to institutional design in creating optimal inno-
vation policy, not to Hemel and Ouellette’s larger decoupling 
argument.  As such, they are offered as a friendly amendment—
consistent with Hemel and Ouellette’s commitment to a systems 
based approach—that is itself skeptical of the distinction 
between innovation policy and background rules.  That is, an ac-
count of innovation policy which, in my estimation, is at home 
with—and readily adaptable to—a Rawlsian distributive account 
of innovation policy, committed to maximizing the position of the 
least well-off. 
Consider again the insights surrounding optimal taxation 
rates and maximizing principles.  The preceding discussion iden-
tifies a seemingly neglected dimension to the innovation policy 
puzzle, the acknowledgement of which serves an important 
corrective to a sophisticated and mature scholarly literature at 
the intersection of taxation, intellectual property, and distribu-
tive principles.  To be clear, what the preceding shows is that, 
from a maximizing perspective, the correct evaluation of innova-
tion policy is not merely a comparison between the respective 
costs and benefits of taxation and prizes versus monopolistic 
legal rules, or recombinant arrangements of their constitutive 
components.  Crucially, in the context of a maximizing principle, 
one must attend to the equilibrium among optimal taxation rates 
and optimal entitlement governing legal rules, that is, the 
complete scheme of legal rules to which the innovation policy 
regime will ultimately be endogenous. 
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CONCLUSION 
Notably, maximizing principles, drawn from outside legal 
doctrine, are germane to the construction of legal rules.  Such 
external principles can help alleviate doctrinal conflict through 
the construction of legal rules suffused with such principles.  
Drawing upon the examples above, this Article has shown that 
for maximizing theories, all entitlement-governing legal rules, 
whether traditionally conceived of as background rules or as 
traditional components of intellectual property doctrine, bear a 
conceptual or normative symmetry to one another.  This Article 
has illuminated this symmetry through examples involving a 
notable doctrinal crisis.  This Article yields a bold claim con-
cerning the ownership and control of property ownership and 
entitlements: in the context of maximizing principles, canonical 
bodies of intellectual property law, such as patent and copyright, 
cannot be coherently evaluated independently of what are only 
erroneously conceived of as background rules to intellectual 
property, such as the rules of taxation and bankruptcy.  Further, 
this Article diagnoses and remedies an important omission in the 
scholarly literature surrounding intellectual property concerning 
optimal legal rules and optimal tax rates.  This Article concludes 
that optimal innovation policy turns on (1) empirical questions, 
as discussed above in the context of copyright, concerning, for 
example, the current state of technology; (2) the structure of the 
complete set of optimal legal rules defining ownership inclusive of 
optimal taxation rates; and (3) the governing external maximizing 
principle being applied.  The very conception of optimality is goal- 
or maximand-dependent; importantly, the structure of innovation 
policy—for example, the measure of monopolistic protection, if 
any, that is optimal to wealth maximization—is not identical to 
the measure that is optimal to maximizing the position of the 
least well-off.  These conclusions are offered as a helpful correc-
tive to the mature and sophisticated literature surrounding 
intellectual property and innovation policy. 
